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Abstract
First responders and professionals in hazardous occupations undergo training and
evaluations for the purpose of mitigating risk and damage. For example, helicopter
pilots train with multiple categorized simulations that increase in complexity before
flying a real aircraft. However in the industrial control cyber incident response do-
main, where incident response professionals help detect, respond and recover from cy-
ber incidents, no official categorization of training environments exist. To address this
gap, this thesis provides a categorization of industrial control training environments
based on realism. Four levels of environments are proposed and mapped to Bloom’s
Taxonomy. This categorization will help organizations determine which training en-
vironment best aligns with their training needs and budgets.
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A FRAMEWORK FOR CATEGORIZATION OF INDUSTRIAL CONTROL
SYSTEM
CYBER TRAINING ENVIRONMENTS
I. Introduction
1.1 Motivation
On the evening of April 17th, 2013 in the city of West, Texas, an act of arson
at a fertilizer plant resulted in an explosion that killed 15 people; 10 were first re-
sponders fighting the fire. The deaths were the result of unprepared first responders
who were not trained to handle a chemical fire and did not fully comprehend the
explosive hazard of the materials within the plant [19, 10]. The Emergency Planning
and Community Right to Know Act requires all companies to report any potential
chemical hazards stored in their facilities. However, there are no legal requirements
for the local first responders to train according to the reports.
The mechanical processes within an industrial environment are controlled by sys-
tems that generally lack cyber security and possess the ability to pose a physical
threat to personnel and equipment. The first responders that are tasked to address
cyber incidents within an industrial control environment must be properly trained
and prepared to deal with various types of industrial cyber related situations. The
training should include a holistic curriculum and a variety of training environments
that enable responders to gradually increase their knowledge while ensuring necessary
skills for handling incidents in a hazardous environment.
To avoid disasters like the Texas explosion, it is imperative to use training envi-
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ronments that have the capability to provide training and assessment for the range
of ICS incident response knowledge. The skills that a cyber ICS first responder needs
must be identified to provide these training environments. Once the necessary skills
are identified, the components of industrial control environments that necessitate
those skills can be derived enabling the creation of training environments that ensure
comprehensive ICS response capability assessment. There is currently no accepted
method to categorize the existing cyber environments in terms of their capabilities
and components.
This thesis proposes a framework for the identification and mapping of ICS cyber
incident response skills to ICS training environment components. This thesis also
proposes a categorization of training environments based on practicality and real-
ism. This categorization helps organizations determine the best fit regarding cyber
response training for personnel and budgets.
1.2 Contributions
This research proposes industrial control cyber response skills that a cyber first
responder requires to effectively respond to a cyber incident in an industrial control
environment and the training components that are necessary to assess the proposed
skills. This research also proposes a categorization of tiered training environment that
can be constructed to ensure a curricula that is inclusive of the presented skills and
provides environment and exercise scenario examples for each category. The research
presented makes the following contributions to the industrial control cyber response
community.
1. Provides a survey of existing industrial control training environments.
2. Provides a framework which identifies the skills of an ICS incident responder
and maps the skills to the components of an ICS training environment.
2
3. Categorizes training environments into five levels of increasing realism and rel-
evance.
4. Leverages educational taxonomies for analysis and differentiation of training
environments.
5. Introduces scenarios and components to match each level of the proposed cate-
gorization.
3
II. Background
2.1 The Need for ICS Cyber Incident Response
A lack of industrial control system (ICS) cyber defense has caused concern within
the community. Contributing factors for the lack of defense include cost, diversity of
the systems, and lack of demand from users who are reluctant to make any changes
to their current operational system. The overdue awareness and scrutiny needed for
ICS cyber security and incident response has only recently begun to propagate its
way into the community. The long life cycle and high cost of industrial technologies
results a reluctance for organizations to upgrade their system’s security [27].
Due to the vulnerable nature of the operational technology, every organization
should plan for proper cyber incident response resulting in a damage mitigating recov-
ery and deep forensic analysis of the root cause of the incident. An improper response
to a cyber incident in an industrial control environment can result in irrecoverable
damages or ineffective corrective actions [27]. These proprietary and unique systems
require experts in the specific field of operational technology (OT) cyber security
for the purpose of incident response and forensics due to inherent discrepancies be-
tween the OT environment and traditional IT cyber security practices. Traditional
defense software such as intrusion detection systems (IDS) and firewalls may not be
deployable in an effective manner on ICS networks due to the proprietary nature of
the protocols and the risk of such technology bringing down critical portions of the
system or adjacent components. New control technology is becoming more security
centric, however the technology was built with successful operation and durability as
the priorities. A model commonly used to guide cyber security policies is the CIA
triad which stands for confidentiality, integrity and availability. While IT systems
may prioritize confidentiality and integrity over availability leading to system down-
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times and security features that are inconvenient for system users, industrial control
systems have prioritized availability to ensure that systems running critical processes
don’t experience downtime due to cumbersome security features. Older legacy sys-
tems are still widely deployed in critical infrastructure and industry with 70% of the
existing technology being ten years or older in 2008 [9]. With the high cost of compo-
nent replacement and the difficulties of taking the systems offline, there is a need for
the capability to defend the existing infrastructure from real time cyber intrusions.
Increasing the cyber security stance of an industrial control facility is rarely triv-
ial due to the proprietary nature of the hardware and software being used, however
security must be increased to mitigate the possibility of cyber attacks causing fa-
cility damage or bodily harm to organization employees. Technology replacement
and upgrades usually involve heavy participation from the vendor and integrator. To
safely apply system changes, a deep analysis of the system is needed to understand
the secondary effects of taking the system offline for any period of time. Equipment
that has an integral part of the business operation may not be possible to replace
in a seamless manner, leaving the organization with a low security legacy system.
Software Patches for these systems requires extensive testing for compatibility before
deployment which is impossible to do in many cases. Vulnerabilities may also be
reported long before a patch is released due to a lack of product support from the
vendor, delay for testing, or a limited demand. The devices that control the behavior
of system sensors and actuators are the most valuable assets for an attacker and the
difficulties of increasing the security in these devices make them the most vulnerable.
[9]
Security regulations for industry and infrastructure are difficult to create and
enforce due to the diversity of the systems, the inability of organizations to afford
proper security and the possibility of regulations causing crippling damage to systems.
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The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS) have both published multiple documents providing rec-
ommendations on improving industrial control system cyber security. The consensus
of the documentation is to create policies for workers within an organization that
discourages the opening of attack vectors onto the operational technology (OT) en-
vironment and the placement of firewalls or air gaps to separate the IT side of the
organization from the OT side [24]. This strategy of isolation can easily fail due to
improper deployment or security policy violations providing attackers direct access to
the operational technology and the field devices that control the system endpoints.
While organizational security regulations can be easily deployed and enforced on IT
networks due to the prioritization of confidentiality and integrity, they contradict the
emphasis of availability in the operational environment.
Most operations and management staff within ICS do not have the necessary
skills to properly collect, analyze and examine the command and control traffic in
their system and will have difficulty deciphering a cyber attack from a non cyber
related malfunction [9]. They also most likely do not have the skills to properly
isolate and eradicate a threat, therefore they will heavily rely on vendor or integrator
support in times of malfunction or attack. Vendors hold proprietary knowledge about
individual system components while integrators who have constructed the system as
a whole will have the original configuration and logic files for the system as well as a
cohesive understanding of the process. Support from a vendor should be discussed as
part of an incident preparation plan to ensure that issues involving vendor contracts
and warranties do not interrupt an immediate response to an attack. Vendor support
may be necessary and the delay of response from a vendor can result in catastrophic
damage or financial loss to the affected organization.
The system integrators who handle the logistics system construction and config-
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urations have a crucial role in the matter of incident recovery and response. It is
likely that the engineering and configuration files that were created at the time of a
system’s deployment are stored by the integrators for backup and reference purposes.
The integrators bid for the contract to create the system that meets the organization’s
requirements for operation and they do so by contacting vendors to acquire support
and components and then engineering the system itself. Proprietary knowledge of the
system is held by the integrator who will have a deeper functional understanding than
an everyday operator. To properly handle an incident, analysis of the whole system is
necessary, however a lot of systems contain components from many different vendors
making the integrators a valuable asset for operational knowledge.
The need for organizations to deploy a specific incident response team for ICS
cyber is driven by high cyber risk and vulnerability in physically hazardous environ-
ments. DHS recommended practices for ICS incident response includes a plan for
organizing an ICS security team internal to an organization [27]. This plan is not
always possible due to lack of skilled staff in the area of cyber security or the lack of
funding to higher security specialists. Dedicated emergency response teams need to
be accessible to organizations for a guaranteed tailored response to ICS cyber attacks.
Whether a response team is constructed internally, or contracted out to an external
organization, a plan needs to be in place for an organization to deploy personnel in a
swift and efficient manner.
2.2 Training Environments for ICS Incident Response
Contributing factors include cost, diversity of the systems, long life cycles and lack
of demand from organizations that are reluctant to make changes to their operational
system [27]. Most ICS organization personnel do not have the necessary skills to
properly collect, analyze and examine the command and control traffic in their system
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and will likely have difficulty deciphering a cyber attack from a non-cyber related
malfunction [9]. Not every ICS organization can support a high level of training for
their cyber response team, however, they may be able to support a lower level of
training that balances organizational goals and budgets.
To properly train ICS cyber security professionals and response teams, training
environments and capabilities that support training at different levels of expertise
ranging from introductory simulations to full scale control systems need to exist. Ef-
fective full scale training should incorporate equipment from a number of vendors,
show genuine cyber physical effects and include diverse configurations. The realism
of a full scale testbed would allow trainees and response teams to experience the in-
tricacies of a real system and provide insight into protocols, physical-safety-override
systems and diverse configurations. Deficiencies in training environments and cur-
ricula have been shown to exist for ICS first responders in the training facilities and
courses provided by government, industry and academia (e.g., see [3]).
2.2.1 Government.
Most training provided by the government for the ICS community is offered by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The focus, however, is on the effects of
attacks and development of mitigation strategies as opposed to emergency incident
response. The DHS ICS-CERT advanced training course provides a partial control
system for demonstrating exploit effects and culminates in a red and blue team exer-
cise where participants either attack or defend the control system [14]. The training
environment does not represent a full scale system, however it does include realistic
hardware and displays real physical effects. Participants for the advanced course are
expected to have prior knowledge on both ICS and IT networks. The advanced course
encourages discussion between IT and ICS professionals which enhances the devel-
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opment of contextual knowledge for both communities. In a real incident response
setting, the professionals from the IT and industrial control communities must pro-
ductively communicate to avoid further damage and ensure a successful recovery. The
exercises and training environment falls short in creating a fully complex system and
leans heavily on traditional IT attack and defense rather than focusing on industrial
control specific practices. Participants must travel to the facility in Idaho Falls, Idaho
for the five day course. Idaho National Laboratory claims to have the capabilities
to replicate any customer’s control system specifications to conduct simultaneous at-
tacks on multiple systems or perform customized full-scale cyber attacks on an exact
replica system [12].
Industrial control security research is conducted at Sandia National Laboratories.
Sandia National Laboratories, which operates as a part of the U.S. Department of
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, is a leader in providing industrial
control education and training for industry, government and academia [22]. They
offer a SCADA Assessment Training Course which provides an educational survey of
SCADA and ICS used within the infrastructure and industry. The primary purpose of
the course is to provide methodologies and tools for assessing the security of industrial
systems. The course is only offered at Sandia’s discretion to individuals with need-
to-know and by invitation only [22].
The research laboratories also use an ICS testbed belonging to the DOE known as
the National SCADA Test Bed where there are full scale realistic systems designated
for research. The National SCADA Test Bed recreates real-world control systems for
the purposes of research and education [26]. The realism and fidelity of the testbed
emulates that of a real environment. However, this research facility is not currently
being used to train SCADA/ICS cyber defenders or incident response teams [26].
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2.2.2 Industry.
Industry provisioned training is similar to government training, offering to teach
customers about ICS fundamentals, security auditing and assessment. The training
environments often include hands-on laboratory experience that allows participants to
become familiarized with the vendor’s programmable logic controllers (PLCs) which
may be networked in a way to simulate a real industrial environment. The vendors
often travel to various locations and offer specific courses to individual organizations
[3]. The classes are not tailored to train security experts and are more for the general
education of anyone handling industrial control equipment. While these classes help
in familiarization of components, they do not expose a potential cyber responder to
the complexity of a complete system.
Training environments also exist as control environment simulation software. An
example of control simulation software is the LogixPro-500 PLC Simulator which
combines the RSLogix 500 engineering environment with the ProSim-II programmable
process simulation that emulates a PLC [25]. While this simulation software is not
security focused, it can assist in introducing beginner level defenders to the logic of
industrial controllers.
2.2.3 Academia.
Academia also uses assorted testbeds for research and education. Mississippi State
University has an ICS testbed that emulates a real world control system with physical
processes for industrial control cyber security [16]. Other organizations in academia
have constructed ICS environments with fully or partially simulated controllers and
processes. Reaves et al. [20] created a testbed that fully simulates an ICS environment
including the simulation of control systems and physical processes. Wertzberger et
al.’s [28] environment combines real world control hardware with simulated physical
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processes and network for a training environment that is a step beyond full simula-
tion. While these environments are great for introductory training and conceptual
education, they lack the complexity of a full scale system and emergency response
procedures.
The SANS Institute, a cooperative research and education organization provides
training for customers through online courses, classrooms or in a mentored settings
around the world. Their effort to construct an ICS training environment resulted
in the SANS CyberCity. The CyberCity is a scaled model of a small city that is
controlled by computers, networks, control hardware and embedded devices emulat-
ing infrastructure including the power grid, water system, traffic system and HVAC
systems [23]. This model city (controlled by ICS systems) is coupled with an on-site
course in Austin, Texas that guides participants through various missions that pro-
vide exposure to components of industrial control systems. The course is an adequate
overview of ICS components including human machine interfaces (HMIs), various in-
dustrial protocols and data historians. The model city training environment coupled
with control hardware allows participants to view the physical effects of their cyber
actions while providing context for realistic vendor supplied technology. The course
succeeds in providing participants an overview in common security flaws and thwart-
ing attacks against industrial systems.
2.3 Bloom’s Taxonomy: A Cognitive Complexity Framework
Educational frameworks have been created to provide insight on the cognitive
value acquired from an educational activity (e.g., assigned projects or homework).
An educational psychologist named Benjamin Bloom (1913-1999) sought to classify
educational goals and objectives based upon cognitive complexity [11]. The result was
Bloom’s Taxonomy which was revised in 2001 and is widely used today by teachers and
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professors for structuring courses that encourage students to learn, apply knowledge
and develop an array of thinking skills.
Bloom’s revised taxonomy consists of six major categories of educational goals
which are listed in order from the least complex category to the most. The taxonomy
illustrates the progression of cognitive complexity from basic understanding to the
creation of original ideas and concepts. To develop original ideas within a field of
study, you must first solidify a base of knowledge to gain holistic context which
places emphasis and importance on all levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy. The framework
provides a way to align educational tools to the level of skill and complexity that the
tool is meant to invoke.
Table 1. Bloom’s Taxonomy (revised) [15, 11].
1. Remembering
Retrieving, recognizing and recalling relevant knowledge from
long-term memory.
2. Understanding
Constructing meaning from oral, written and graphic messages
through interpreting, exemplifying, classifying, summarizing,
inferring, comparing and explaining.
3. Applying
Carrying out or using a procedure through executing or imple-
menting.
4. Analyzing
Breaking material into constituent parts, determining how the
parts relate to one another and their overall purpose through
differentiating, organizing and attributing.
5. Evaluating
Making judgments based on criteria and standards through
checking and critiquing.
6. Creating
Putting elements together to form a coherent or functional
whole; reorganizing elements into a new pattern or structure
through generating, planning or producing.
2.4 Relating Bloom’s Taxonomy to Existing Training Platforms
Bloom strongly suggests acquiring concrete knowledge before increasing the intri-
cacy of the training environment presented to the student. In many fields of education,
especially those with a high risk of incurring damage to property or injury, a form
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of training simulation is often used to gradually introduce the trainee or student to
more variables of complexity before attempting the authentic hazardous task.
Simulations to build a base of knowledge and comfort for trainees have been used
in multiple hazardous and highly technical professions (e.g., military weapons and
vehicle operation, aircraft piloting and astronautics). The U.S. Army uses multiple
tank simulators to qualify their gunnery soldiers and drivers before operating a real
tank [2, 1]. The Army also uses simulations for generic marksmanship training for its
soldiers called the Engagement Skills Trainer. To take their training a step further,
the Army also uses a training tool called the Virtual Convoy Operations Trainer where
collective training can be practiced in a virtual environment and multiple soldiers can
train together [4]. These simulations ensure soldier readiness before deployment into
unpredictable and dangerous environments.
The U.S. Air Force trains pilots by assessing proficiency in simple simulations,
gradually adding complexity into the simulations and finally conducting fully realistic
live training. The Air Force boasts a wide range of simulation capabilities, from
full mission simulators to desktop PC-based simulations [18]. The live training that
the Air Force provides is comprised of real equipment, weaponry, environments and
targets. Examples of live training are engaging aerial targets, deploying drones and
firing munitions. Ensuring the competence of fighter pilots using realistic training
scenarios before conducting real operations lowers the risk for damage (or death) in
an inherently dangerous profession.
For private helicopter pilot training, different categories of training simulations,
known as Flight Simulation Training Devices (FSTDs), have been defined with cer-
tification criteria. The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) is the certifying
authority for the flight simulation training environments and has developed exact
specifications that define each level of environment. The specifications define the ex-
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act capabilities that each level of environment is required to provide to be certified,
with specifications defining everything from the size of the cockpit to the sound of rain
hitting the aircraft’s windshield in a virtualized environment [7]. The categories are:
(i) Flight and Navigational Procedures Trainers (FNPT); (ii) Flight Training Devices
(FTD); (iii) Full Flight Simulators (FFS); and (iv) Other Training Devices (OTD)
covering any unregulated training tool or environment. Each of the categories serves
a different purpose by introducing new variables and increasing realism (see Table
2). These simulation categories of increasing realism were created to ensure that pi-
lots demonstrate mastery of the equipment and procedures in training to reduce risk
during real flights.
Table 2. Types of FSTDs [8].
1. FNPT
A fixed-base generic system, primarily used for helicopter initial
and refresher training, including basic and safety procedures,
emergencies, navigation, instrument rating and multi-crew co-
operation.
2. FTD
A fixed-based system, simulating a specific type of helicopter.
In addition to the FNTP capabilities, the FTD is designed for
rating pilots on specific helicopter types. This FSTD has a
limited checking/testing capability due to the fact that it does
not include a motion or vibration system.
3. FFS
A motion-base system, which provides, in a addition to the
FTD, motion and vibration cues. It has the highest level of
technical complexity and training capability and can be used
for proficiency evaluation
4. OTD
Other training devices exist and can be defined as a training aid
where a complete cockpit or flight deck is unnecessary. There
are no regulations covering OTDs and can vary in form from a
desktop computer to a helicopter dashboard. These devices are
often used to drill pre-flight tasks or familiarize a pilot with a
single cockpit instrument.
NASA houses a multitude of training simulators to familiarize its trainees with
many environments and situations (e.g., launch, landing, payload and rendezvous
activities) [17]. These simulations include both fixed-based and motion-based simula-
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tors. Astronauts train for a combined total of 300 hours in these simulators to qualify
for real operations. NASA training also extends outside of the virtual environment
and attempts to recreate the environment of space with specialized aircraft, pools
and other technologies. This training is necessary for the astronauts to gain comfort
and confidence before operating in the hazardous and unpredictable environment of
space.
Every training environment provided by these organizations are intended to grad-
ually assimilate the trainees into a real, complex and diverse environment. Each en-
vironment serves a different purpose and is tailored toward the needs of the trainee.
With every step forward in the training process, a new training platform is intro-
duced which provides new concepts and builds the strong base of knowledge needed
to operate in the unpredictable real environment.
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III. Methodology
3.1 A Framework for ICS Training Environment Development
A framework for training environment development enables organizations to cus-
tomize training components to fit their needs. A framework that enables ICS response
organizations to map ICS incident response skills to training environment capabili-
ties would ensure the training goals of the organizations are addressed. There is
currently no accepted method to categorize the existing environments in terms of
their capabilities and components.
The framework presented in this section identifies ICS first response skills and
training environment components that facilitate those skills. The skills will be bro-
ken down into overarching phases of a cyber incident response that follow the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Incident Response Lifecycle [5]. The
skills presented in each phase of the lifecycle are the result of the analysis and con-
solidation of multiple sources including the NIST National Cybersecurity Workforce
Framework, DHS Recommended Practice publications, NIST guides for incident han-
dling and ICS security and curricula for publicly available ICS security classes.
The NIST Incident Response Lifecycle is split into four iterative phases. The
phases are (i) preparation, (ii) detection and analysis, (iii) containment, eradication
and recovery, and (iv) post-incident activity. These general phases will be used for
the categorization of the consolidated ICS incident response skills presented in this
section. An additional section for components that enable effective training adminis-
tration is also present in the framework.
16
3.1.1 Preparation.
The preparation phase of cyber incident response focuses on an organization’s
readiness to rapidly and effectively respond to a cyber attack. NIST describes the
phase as establishing an incident response capability and taking preventive measures
by ensuring the security of networks, systems and applications. This includes the
gathering of hardware and software response tools and establishing lines of commu-
nication for the response team members [5].
When considering incident response preparation for an ICS network, the defense in
depth strategy is not always possible for a response team who in most cases will only
interact with a system once an incident has taken place. The time-sensitive responses
for unfamiliar environments necessitates that the preparation phase be largely focused
on the acquisition of generally applicable knowledge about ICS systems that can be
used in a variety of environments.
Necessary Skills for Preparation.
• Risk and Recovery Prioritization: The ability to prioritize which compo-
nents pose the biggest security threat for the system as a whole, determining
which system components should be addressed.
• Attack Vector Assessment: The skill of understanding the attack path that
an intruder might take when attempting to compromise the system. A responder
must be able to understand how an attacker can gain access and the techniques
used to manipulate and pivot through the network.
• Communication with Asset Owner: Communicating with the asset owner
and employees is essential to gain an understanding of the operation of the
system. This allows the responders to gain insight on the possible scope of
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damage, network layouts and the limitations of the response effort. The skill
enables the execution of all other skills for the preparation phase.
• Competency with Control System Components: A responder must un-
derstand the purpose of the components within a process and how the com-
ponents (e.g., engineering software, control hardware and control interfaces)
operate to gain insight on any irregularities, malfunctions or manipulations.
Components Necessary for Assessing Preparation Skills.
• System Familiarization Components: Examples of system familiarization
components include descriptions of the devices that guide the risk and recovery
prioritization of the response plan and network maps that assess a participant’s
ability to understand the role of operational technology within the industrial
network.
• Control Hardware: Physical industrial control devices that facilitate the op-
eration of a physical process. Examples include a PLC or a remote terminal
unit (RTU).
• Engineering Software: The software used for programming and remote con-
trol of industrial control hardware. This software is often proprietary and pro-
vided by a vendor who develops control hardware.
• Human Machine Interface (HMI) Software: Software that allows the
monitoring and control a physical process. This software typically lets a human
interact with current tasks or analyze the operational status of a process.
• Real Control Process: A realistic process is one that is typically used in an
industrial setting and provides a trainee with the opportunity to interact with
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realistic physical process models. An example includes a wastewater cleansing
process where large pieces of waste are extracted from wastewater using a large
screening grate.
• Varied Industrial Control Vendor Exposure: The exposure of a trainee to
multiple proprietary control technologies within a single training environment.
3.1.2 Detection and Analysis.
One of the most challenging parts of incident response is accurately detecting an
attack and determining the scope of the problem [5]. This phase is complicated by
the wide range of detection technologies that may be conflicting, inaccurate or incom-
plete. Asset owners may also have malfunctions that are not necessarily malicious.
While an ICS response team is normally not the primary detector of the incident, a
response team must be able to identify the potential signs of the problem and con-
firm through methods of detection and analysis that the problem is malicious. The
team must have the capabilities to engage with all sources of incident indicators in-
cluding intrusion detection systems (IDS), antivirus, security information and event
management systems (SIEMs) and logging systems that are both network based and
operating system based.
While traditional detection devices are valuable, an ICS specific team should be
Table 3. Preparation: Skills and components.
Skills Components
Risk and Recovery Prioritization System Familiarization Components
Attack Vector Assessment Control Hardware
Communication with Asset Owner Engineering Software
Competency with Control System Components HMI Software
Real Control Process
Varied Industrial Control Vendor Exposure
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able to apply their industrial control knowledge to detect any malicious effects that
may be physically visible or viewable from control specific software. This adds a
layer of complexity upon traditional IT intrusion detection. Spotting ambiguous
ICS symptoms (e.g. slight configuration changes or altered control logic) can be
challenging considering the many different types of proprietary technologies built
into industrial systems. These skills and abilities rely heavily on the responders
understanding of normal environment behavior.
Necessary Skills for Detection and Analysis.
• Anomaly and Event Detection: The ability to use software and hardware
detection to pinpoint anomalies and events that impact the system operation.
• Traffic Monitoring and Analysis: The ability to monitor and filter traffic
to track down malicious behavior in the network and the skill of analyzing and
understanding the traffic that is being sent over the ICS network.
• System Component Monitoring: The ability to monitor control compo-
nents and their logical execution to analyze functionality and detect abnormal-
ities. This includes monitoring through software and physical means.
• Log Analysis: The forensic skill of analyzing logs on the network to trace an
incident to its cause and track an attacker.
Assessing and honing the skills listed above requires a system that is capable of
providing the assets that implement detection technologies, physical effects of mali-
cious activity and realistic challenges of detection. The more realistic the traffic and
detection systems are the more challenging the training can become. The size of the
training system and amount of components can also expand the challenge of detecting
malicious activity.
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Training Components Necessary for Assessing Detection and Anal-
ysis Skills.
• Physical Component Effects: The physical operation of a control process
(e.g., the actual pumping of water in a wastewater treatment plant environ-
ment).
• System Logging: The capability for the environment to log system interac-
tions and industrial process data through the use of data historians or network
logging tools. This enables a trainee to analyze and interact with industrial
forensic data.
• Realistic Industrial Network Traffic Generation: The realism and variety
of industrial network traffic in terms of real industrial protocols (e.g., Modbus,
EtherNet IP or DeviceNet) providing a trainee with practical industrial protocol
exposure for analysis and monitoring purposes.
• Anomaly Detection Tools: Software or hardware tools that allow the detec-
tion of anomalies on the industrial network through the analysis of network traf-
fic or analysis of the physical process (e.g., Grassmarlin and Symantec Anomaly
Detection for Industrial Control Systems).
Table 4. Detection and Analysis: Skills and components.
Skills Components
Anomaly and Event Detection Physical Component Effects
Traffic Monitoring and Analysis System Logging
System Component Monitoring Realistic Industrial Network Traffic Generation
Log Analysis Anomaly Detection Tools
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3.1.3 Containment, Eradication and Recovery Phase.
The phase of containment, eradication and recovery focuses of the responder’s
ability to choose and apply an appropriate strategy that includes quarantine, evidence
handling, source identification, threat eradication and restoration [5].
Containment strategies include complete disconnection of the attacker or source
of activity, sand boxing or network filtration. Any activity that mitigates the problem
as a temporary solution to decrease the malicious activity and prevent further dam-
age can be deemed containment. A strategy for containing the threat must take into
consideration the possible consequences (e.g., internal damage, evidence preservation
and solution duration) [5]. In an ICS specific environment, the strategy of disconnec-
tion can lead to catastrophic effects for the control process where components may
depend upon each other for interoperability. The same problem can arise in an op-
erational environment during an attempt to filter traffic. It is important for an ICS
incident responder to understand system operations before making any isolation or
containments decisions.
Evidence gathering and handling is used as a way to document the incident and
for use in legal proceedings. Evidence should include any identifying information,
information of personnel who handled and gathered the evidence, times and dates of
occurrences contained in the evidence and evidence storage locations [5].
This phase should also focus on the identification of the attacking host, which is
necessary to appropriately gather evidence, deploy containment strategies and erad-
icate the problem. Identification includes listing suspicious IP and MAC addresses,
conducting research on the hosts and using continuous monitoring techniques on any
suspicious host to confirm (or deny) the suspicions. It is crucial to identify all mali-
cious hosts to properly eradicate the threat to the system.
If a control system component has been compromised and altered beyond repair,
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a replacement may be necessary to ensure the integrity of the system. A software
solution would be the identification and removal of any accounts that have been
compromised or created in the incident or the removal of a malware implant in a
system. To properly recover, a response team must be able to accurately assess
the cause of the problem and apply fixes in the form of software patches, hardware
replacement and ensure the removal of the access point. Once the threat has been
completely eradicated and the system restored, a series of tests must be completed
ensuring the return of the system to a normal state. Developing tests for different
types of control systems can be challenging and requires the synthesis of system
operation knowledge with the precise comprehension of the malicious effects.
Necessary Skills for Containment, Eradication and Recovery.
• Evidence Gathering and Handling: The skill of gathering and handling
evidence in a way that does not compromise the investigation process.
• Attacker Identification: The ability to identify the source of the incident
through forensic investigation.
• Disconnection or Sandboxing of Attacker: The ability to isolate the attack
source from the network and ensure that no further damage can be done by the
attacker.
• Identify and Mitigate Exploited Vulnerabilities: The ability to identify
the vulnerabilities that were exploited in the attack and mitigate the security
weaknesses.
• Return of Systems to Operational State: Rapidly returning the system
to an operational state, mitigating any physical or financial losses and testing
to ensure the system was restored properly.
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To assess the ability of a responder to mitigate, document and eradicate an at-
tack, a training environment must include elements that allow the trainee to conduct
actions to stop an attack while also taking necessary actions to keep the system as
functional as possible.
Training Components Necessary for Assessing Containment, Eradi-
cation and Recovery.
• Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options: The ability to physically dis-
connect portions of the system or the ability to isolate a portion of the system
by some form of sandboxing.
• Filtering Capabilities: The ability to deploy filtering technology (e.g., fire-
wall) in an effective manner within the system.
• Real Malware or Attack Scripts: Realistic attack scenarios or code that
have genuine effects to the system allowing trainees to detect and defend against
practical attacks.
• Emergency Backup Operation Equipment: The capability of deploying
manual backup operations as a way to keep a critical process from completely
failing. This allows a participant to prioritize system operation in necessary
situations.
• Acceptance Test Execution Capabilities: The capability for a trainee to
create and deploy acceptance tests for the system to ensure recovery.
3.1.4 Post-Incident Activity.
The post-incident activity phase is the synthesis of conclusions from gathered
evidence.
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Table 5. Containment, eradication and recovery: Skills and components.
Skills Components
Evidence Gathering and Handling Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options
Attacker Identification Filtering Capabilities
Disconnection or Sandboxing of Attacker Real Malware or Attack Scripts
Identify and Mitigate Exploited Vulnerabilities Emergency Backup Operation Equipment
Return of Systems to Operational State Acceptance Test Execution Capabilities
Necessary Skills for Post-Incident Activity.
• Handling and Analysis of Malware: The ability to understand the effect
of malware and the proper way to handle it.
• Incident Documentation: The ability to synthesize conclusions from evi-
dence and knowledge for the purpose of accurate documentation and response
justification.
Training Components for Assessing Post-Incident Activity.
• Documentation Standards: A non-technology component to ensure the
trainee understands the documentation process for their organization.
• Malware Analysis Tools: Analysis software that a trainee can use to dissect
and analyze malware (e.g., IDA Pro, OllyDbg and WinDbg).
3.1.5 Training Administration for Environments.
The ability to ensure effective training and provide feedback for trainees is key for
any training environment. While this is not part of the incident response lifecycle,
Table 6. Post-Incident activity: Skills and components.
Skills Components
Handling and Analysis of Malware Documentation Standards
Incident Documentation Malware Analysis Tools
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administration of training is paramount to the education of participants. The more
detailed feedback that a trainer can provide, the more a trainee can learn from their
experience in a training environment. To enable the trainer to effectively monitor
activities in the training environment, certain range components are required that
provide insight into the progression of the training activities. The following compo-
nents are necessary for full monitoring capabilities within an environment.
Training Components Necessary for Training Administration.
• Real Time View of Physical Signal Exchange: The ability for an ad-
ministrator to view the signal inputs and outputs of system endpoints (sensors
and actuators). This is necessary to ensure the administrator is assessing an
accurate representation of an environment even when the integrity of the sys-
tem monitoring components within an environment has been comprised and are
untrustworthy for assessment purposes [31].
• Remote Administrative Monitoring: The ability for an administering au-
thority to assess trainees and control the exercise from a different physical lo-
cation than the exercise environment.
• Remote Participation: The ability to administer exercises on the environ-
ment to participants located in physically separated locations.
Table 7. Training administration: skills and components.
Components
Real Time View of Physical Signal Exchange
Remote Administrative Monitoring
Remote Participation
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3.2 Categorization Levels of ICS Training Environments
This section introduces levels of ICS training environments based on practical
components and capabilities. While each level may have a varying range of capabili-
ties, the primary delimiter of the levels is the practicality they provide in the context
of a real industrial control system.
3.2.1 Level 0 Training Environments.
A Level 0 training environment is the presentation of information to a trainee
through oral, written or graphical means. This type of environment is usually a
classroom setting with lectures and presentation slides that provide a trainee with
basic facts and explanation. This base of knowledge allows a trainee to understand
the environment domain and provides meaning and context for the training. These
training environments are easily coupled with higher level training environments in
order to ensure a baseline of foundational knowledge before a trainee must apply their
knowledge as skills.
3.2.2 Level 1 Training Environments.
A Level 1 training environment is completely software defined and operates within
a program simulating an industrial controller or control system. This level of envi-
ronment can provide simplified education and training for inexperienced trainees by
defining controller operations and enabling familiarization with control process logic.
Existing examples of this environment include the LogixPro-500 PLC simulator
and the Honeyd PLC interaction software [25, 29]. These environments provide no
real physical interaction and are constructed of software defined capabilities. Basic
interaction and programming can be implemented, however, there is no way to guar-
antee that these simulation programs will mimic the exact behavior of real control
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hardware and software. For example, the Honeyd PLC simulation software supports
2000 TCP requests per second with 65,536 hosts compared to real programmable logic
controllers which support significantly fewer connections [29]. These environments are
also limited due to the inability to provide realistic defensive response interactions.
Level 1 environments also do not allow for physical disconnect options that would be
available to defenders in a real environment.
Fully simulated (Level 1) environments can provide many capabilities within high
fidelity software but lacks real physical devices. Level 1 environments do not provide
participant exposure to real control hardware, or vendor supplied engineering and
HMI software. While a simulated environment can attempt to recreate engineering
or HMI software, no actual communication can occur between vendor hardware and
the software. Acquiring exposure to multiple industrial vendor hardware and software
is not available in a strictly software defined environment.
3.2.3 Level 2 Training Environments.
A Level 2 training environment consists of an emulated control process that in-
cludes real physical effects but is not constructed of real vendor hardware and soft-
ware. This level of environment can be constructed using embedded devices (e.g.,
Arduino, Raspberry Pi or BeagleBone) which can be programmed to control physical
sensors and actuators using common programming languages (e.g., C and Python).
Level 2 training environments are used as training platforms and research testbeds
for many organizations. Researchers at the Air Force Institute of Technology have
created a Level 2 environment as a research testbed emulating a vehicle Controller
Area Network (CAN) bus that is controlled by a BeagleBone Black (see Figure 1).
The environment is used to test the effects of CAN bus attacks on vehicular control.
The DHS ICS-CERT organization uses portable Level 2 training platforms to conduct
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basic ICS classes and exercises. A company called Cybati has created Level 2 training
kits called CybatiWorks which are Raspberry Pi control emulation devices that pair
with low voltage sensors and actuators (such as stoplights represented as mounted
LEDs) [6]. While Level 2 environments can show physical effects and emulate process
control, the environments are still restricted to the code placed on the embedded
devices and cannot be guaranteed to mirror the exact behavior of a real industrial
controller.
Figure 1. AFIT automotive CAN bus emulation testbed.
3.2.4 Level 3 Training Environments.
A Level 3 environment is constructed of real process control hardware and soft-
ware controlling a partial industrial control system. Consider a wastewater treatment
facility, an example of a Level 3 environment would be the hardware and software
controlling the lift station portion of the wastewater treatment process. While these
environments are not fully realistic, they do attempt to represent a scaled realism.
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It allows for the familiarization of vendor equipment, industrial networks, realistic
process logic and portability without the necessity of a full facility and costly main-
tenance.
Existing Level 3 environments are used for a variety of security related activities.
Sandia SCADA Security Development Laboratory is used for testing and creating
security practices, programs and protocols and would be considered a Level 3 envi-
ronment [21]. Other examples include the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT)
stoplight system controlled by Allen Bradley MicroLogix PLCs used to teach ICS
defense classes (see Figure 2). The SANS Cybercity combines elements of a Level 2
range and a Level 3 to create a robust experience in a compact environment [23].
A Level 3 environment may be fully capable and have all exercise environment
capabilities but it will still lack the realism of a full-scale system. It cannot supply
an in-depth understanding of the physical cyber effects on a real world system where
an incident or malfunction may have cascading effects do to the interconnection of
the system processes [3].
3.2.5 Level 4 Training Environments.
A Level 4 training environment is a genuine industrial control system facility with
functional processes. This would be an industrial control facility that is constructed
exactly how it would be for its intended application and is used to conduct cyber
exercises. Cyber exercises conducted in a real environment allows the trainee to have
full immersion into the training scenarios where unpredictable cascading attack effects
may require novel solutions.
Existing Level 4 training environments are located at the Atterbury-Muscatatuck
Urban Training Center (MUTC) near Butlerville, Indiana. This training compound is
owned and operated by the Indiana National Guard and is used for military and first
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Figure 2. Mounted stoplight control system used by AFIT for ICS security labs.
response training and consists of many industrial facilities that make up many sepa-
rate Level 4 environments. The facilities include a power plant, oil refinery, prison,
hospital, subway station, power distribution and a wastewater treatment facility [13].
It should be noted that the cyber portion of the MUTC is somewhat lacking, however
plans are being implemented to correct the deficiencies.
3.3 Mapping of Training Environment Levels to Bloom’s Taxonomy
As the level of training environment increases so does the level of cognitive com-
plexity and thinking that can be assessed in the environment. The complexity of train-
ing scenarios that can be presented in an ICS environment depends on the amount
of realism which can provide real interaction and observations. Bloom’s taxonomy
can be mapped to the levels of ICS training environments in terms of training ICS
defenders. The taxonomy is hierarchical in nature, therefore, an environment that
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can administer exercises at higher levels of thinking can also assess all lesser levels in
the taxonomy.
A Level 0 training environment is capable of presenting exercises and problems
that address the first two cognitive levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy, specifically “Remem-
bering” and “Understanding”. This level of training environment allows the trainee to
construct meaning from the written, oral and graphical information being presented.
This level alone does not allow the trainee to apply their knowledge through any kind
of procedure or implementation.
A Level 1 fully simulated ICS training environment is capable of presenting exer-
cises and problems that address the first two cognitive levels of Bloom’s Taxonomy.
With a fully simulated training environment constrained to a program, you can test
a trainee’s ability to recall and retrieve facts that have been programmed into the
simulation, and the trainees can begin to interpret meaning from the lessons and
make references and comparisons from the presented facts. Simulations that allow
for simple PLC interaction can teach a trainee about traditional PLC behavior and
basic concepts. However, there is no guarantee that the control behavior from a sim-
ulation will carry over into a real system due to the scripted limitations of software.
This constrains Level 1 environments from assessing higher levels of Bloom’s Taxon-
omy. Another constraint for a Level 1 environment is the limited ability for an ICS
defender to implement realistic security measures. Since a simulated environment is
only capable of doing what it is programmed to do, a trainee cannot manipulate a
network or change controller implementation to unanticipated configurations.
A Level 2 training environment, where emulated devices perform physical con-
troller functions, provides a platform to assess the “Applying” and “Analyzing” lev-
els of Bloom’s Taxonomy. With this training environment, a trainee can implement
external defenses (e.g., firewalls and network isolation), dissect the environment, dif-
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ferentiate components and attribute control to solve problems, however, a Level 2
environment cannot evaluate a trainee to Bloom’s “Evaluating” level because the cri-
teria and standards that a trainee would need to base their judgments and critiques
on would not be realistic enough.
A Level 3 environment is implemented with vendor supplied industrial hardware
and software, but it is not a fully comprehensive environment. This level of environ-
ment is capable of administering exercises and training up to the “Evaluating” level
of Bloom’s Taxonomy. This level of thinking is defined by making judgments and
critiques based on criteria and standards. Evaluative thinking in an environment of
this level can be done by comparing data and observations with standard operation
criteria of the control component. This real data allows the participants of an ex-
ercise to perform realistic defensive evaluations on an ICS environment. A Level 3
environment struggles to assess trainees at the highest level of Bloom’s Taxonomy.
A Level 4 environment can assess and provide the highest level of thinking in
Bloom’s Taxonomy. This level of thinking is defined by the ability to form a compre-
hensive view of a situation. In the context of ICS defense and incident response, this
type of cognitive complexity cannot be achieved without a fully functional system.
This environment can provide a trainee the opportunity to view and manipulate every
possible element in an actual industrial environment. New and applicable solutions to
defense problems can be applied to functional industrial systems. A Level 4 environ-
ment can help ICS defense trainees discover, correct and address real world problems
with their creativity and see the ramifications (good or bad) of their actions (e.g.,
cascading effects).
3.4 Construction of ICS Training Environments
This section presents training environment examples for each of the five levels.
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Table 8. Mapping ICS training environment levels to Bloom’s Taxonomy.
Bloom’s Taxonomy Training Environment Levels
Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3 Level 4
1. Remembering X X X X X
2. Understanding X X X X X
3. Applying - - X X X
4. Analyzing - - X X X
5. Evaluating - - - X X
6. Creating - - - - X
3.4.1 Construction of Level 0 ICS Training Environments.
The construction of a Level 0 training environment consists of gathering and
presenting information to a trainee. This environment contains no relevant hardware
interaction and assessment in this environment can be presented as a written or oral
exam. Interaction within this training environment would be note taking and posing
questions to solidify topical understanding.
3.4.2 Construction of Level 1 ICS Training Environments.
The LogixPro-500 PLC simulator allows a trainee to provide or manipulate logic
and displays the execution of the logic with simulated sensors and actuators. Using
training scenarios in this simulated environment allows the assessment up to the “Un-
derstanding” level of Bloom’s Taxonomy by allowing the trainee to learn facts about
control system operation and construct visual meaning and interpretation through the
execution of the simulation. This training software environment is free to download
[25].
Level 1 Scenario: Ladder Logic engineering.
• Objective: Given engineering specifications to control a garage door with open
and closed sensors for an industrial control environment, provide logic that
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allows the control hardware to execute the specifications.
• Description: Create Ladder Logic that allows the PLC to control a garage door
with sensors that indicate when the door is opened or closed. The simulation
should run the logic provided by the trainee and visualize the physical response
with a garage door simulator.
• Type: Understanding the functionality and relationship between the control
hardware and logic software.
• Evaluation Criteria: Correctly engineer the specified functionality within three
hours.
• Reference: The provided engineering specifications for the garage door logic,
the LogixPro-500 software help menu and the Rockwell Automation RSLogix
user guide.
Below is a breakdown of the components that are represented in the LogixPro-
500 simulation software training environment. The hardware and software needed is
a single computer system with the LogixPro-500 simulation software installed.
Level 1 LogixPro-500 training environment components.
• Control Hardware: The control hardware is represented in this environment
as a simulated PLC that executes the logic provided by a trainee.
• Engineering Software: The engineering software used in the simulation is a
version of the Allen-Bradley RSLogix500 programming tool.
• HMI Software: The HMI software built into the simulation is an interactive
visual representation of the sensors and actuators. This HMI displays how the
sensors and actuators react to the logic from the simulated control hardware.
35
• Physical Component Effects: The physical effects of the system are repre-
sented on a computer screen.
3.4.3 Construction of Level 2 ICS Training Environments.
Raspberry Pi emulation devices can be programmed to emulate a network of
stoplights using LEDs. Consider a scenario where a controller is attacked interfering
with the timing of the lights. The trainee would have to determine the relationship
between the components to interpret the cause of the incident. This scenario would
assess the “Analyzing” level of Bloom’s Taxonomy. The cost of this environment with
four stoplights is approximately $200.
Level 2 Scenario: Stoplight Logic Manipulation.
• Objective: Given a network of emulated stoplights that are currently out of
sync, return the lights to normal functionality and find the manipulated device.
• Description: Use network traffic monitoring and software analysis to understand
which devices were impacted and find the source of the attack.
• Type: Understanding the functionality and relationship between the control
hardware and logic software and applying response skills to mitigate the effects
of the attack and return the system to normal functionality.
• Evaluation Criteria: Return the system to normal functionality within three
hours and find the source of the attack within one hour.
• Reference: Network and system logs and the code on the Raspberry Pi devices.
The following is a breakdown of the components needed for this training scenario.
The inherent hardware required is a Raspberry Pi development platform with the
logic to control LED lights.
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Level 2 Stoplight Network Training Environment Components.
• Control Hardware: The control hardware is represented in this environment
by a network of Raspberry Pi emulation controllers.
• HMI Software: The HMI software built for this environment would have to
be programmed to view and communicate with the Raspberry Pis.
• Physical Component Effects: The physical effects of the system are repre-
sented by LEDs.
• System Logging: Logging can be implemented into this network through the
Rasberry Pi platforms and passive network monitoring software (e.g., Grass-
marlin).
• Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options: The physical separation of con-
troller devices allows for both network segmentation and physical network dis-
connection.
• Filtering Capabilities: Firewall filtering capabilities are built into the sce-
nario to isolate the ICS network for any outside connections.
3.4.4 Construction of Level 3 ICS Training Environments.
Two examples of Level 3 environments are offered. The environments model a
wastewater treatment plant and a prison facility. Components for each environment
fit within a Pelican 1610 case (62.76 cm x 49.73 cm x 30.3 cm). The environments were
created to be as cost effective as possible while including genuine control hardware
devices. These scenarios assess thinking skills up to the “Evaluating” level of Bloom’s
Taxonomy. Note that the descriptions of these environments are more detailed than
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the other levels to show that high levels of interaction with genuine industrial con-
trol components can be achieved for a relatively low cost while maintaining high
portability.
3.4.4.1 Wastewater Treatment Facility Environment.
The Level 3 wastewater treatment plant environment models the process of a
wastewater aeration basin. An Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC controls the diffusion
of oxygen into two chambers ensuring that the level of oxygen within the chambers
meets the supplied specifications. If the oxygen levels become too high or low, an
alarm will trigger which is displayed by two mounted red lights inside of the exercise
environment. The oxygen fluctuates based on the speed of the blower fans and the
dilation of oxygen valves. This closed control loop of oxygen level maintenance is
controlled by the Allen-Bradley PLC and an Allen-Bradley PowerFlex 40 AC variable
frequency drive (VFD). The PLC controls the valve dilation and computes the oxygen
levels while the VFD dictates the fan speed based on the PLC’s calculations. The
equipment used to create this environment cost approximately $16,500. Consider a
scenario where a wastewater treatment plant experiences a cyber attack causing a
PLC in the aeration basin to malfunction resulting in fluctuating oxygen levels.
Level 3 Example Scenario: Wastewater Treatment Aeration Basin
Failure.
• Objective: Restore the aeration basin to full functionality and find the source
and cause of the incident.
• Description: Using network traffic monitoring, HMI monitoring and visual mon-
itoring the trainee must understand when the system fails and successfully re-
cover the system by blocking access from the attacker and implement emergency
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procedures to restore the failed control hardware to normal functionality.
• Type: Loss of system control and functionality.
• Evaluation Criteria: Return the system to normal functionality within three
hours and find the source of the attack within one hour.
• Reference: ControlLogix PLC manual, PowerFlex 40 AC VFD manual, vulner-
ability reports of the control hardware and a map of the control network.
Level 3 Wastewater Treatment Facility Training Environment Com-
ponents.
• Control Hardware: An Allen-Bradley ControlLogix PLC and an Allen-Bradley
PowerFlex 40 AC VFD were used as the process control hardware for this en-
vironment (see Figure 3).
• Engineering Software: The engineering software used for programming and
remotely controlling the Allen-Bradley PLC is RSLogix 5000 (see Figure 4).
• Real Control Process: The control process for the environment was modeled
from a wastewater aeration basin and controls two zones of oxygen diffusion
using a blower and two valves.
• Physical Component Effects: The speed of the blower fans are controlled
by the VFD and the oxygen valves are controlled and effected by the PLC.
• Realistic Industrial Network Traffic Generation: The network traffic
between the HMI workstation, engineering workstation, VFD and PLC is visible
on the network and constitutes realistic ICS traffic using real industrial protocol
communication including Ethernet/IP and Common Industrial Protocol (CIP).
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• Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options: All machines on the network
can be physically disconnected from their Ethernet ports and network isola-
tion can be achieved through whitelist (and blacklist) capabilities of a Netgear
ProSAFE network switch.
• Filtering Capabilities: Using an Ubiquiti EdgeRouterX router filtering can
be done using simple firewall rules for any network connection in the environ-
ment.
• Real Malware or Attack Scripts: The PLC is vulnerable to a variety of
attacks over the network making this model of PLC a realistic prospect of
incident response.
• Real Time View of Physical Signal Exchange: Using Y-Box technology
(for a detailed description of the Y-Box see [30]), an exercise administrator
can view the operation of the process control endpoints and HMI to track an
ongoing attack (see Figure 5).
• Remote Administrative Monitoring: The White Cell interface for the en-
vironment can be viewed using virtual network computing technology so that an
exercise administrator can view the display of the status of the effected software
and physical hardware.
• Remote Participation: Remote participation can be completed using remote
access tools, however the capabilities of physical manipulation will be hindered.
• Varied Industrial Control Vendor Exposure: There is varied exposure to
industrial components for trainees in this environment due to the use of a PLC
component and a VFD component.
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Figure 3. Level 3 wastewater treatment training environment.
Figure 4. RSLogix 5000 engineering workstation software for the wastewater environ-
ment.
3.4.4.2 Prison Facility Environment.
The Level 3 prison facility training environment was modeled from a prison cell
block containing three prison cells with door lock controls and a mantrap access
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Figure 5. Administrative interface for a real time view of attacking and defending
effects on the wastewater environment.
control system. An Omron PLC controls the function of the buttons, locks, security
lights and alarm. This equipment cost an estimated $1,400. Consider a scenario
where a prison facility experiences a cyber attack that causes a PLC to malfunction
opening prison door locks.
Level 3 Example Scenario: Prison Control System Failure.
• Objective: Restore the prison to full functionality and find the source and cause
of the incident.
• Description: Using network traffic monitoring, HMI monitoring and visual mon-
itoring the trainee must understand when the system fails and successfully re-
cover the system by blocking access from the attacker and implement emergency
procedures to restore the failed control hardware to normal functionality.
• Type: Loss of system control and functionality.
• Evaluation Criteria: Return the system to normal functionality within three
hours and find the source of the attack within one hour.
• Reference: Omron CP1L PLC manual, vulnerability reports of the control hard-
ware and a map of the control network.
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Level 3 Prison Facility Environment Components.
• Control Hardware: An Omron CP1L PLC controls the function of the prison
locks, buttons, lights and alarm (see Figure 6).
• Engineering Software: The engineering software component of the environ-
ment is the Omron CX-Programmer.
• HMI Software: The HMI to control the prison components (see Figure 7) was
created using the open source Schneider Electric IGSS Free50 software.
• Real Control Process: The control process for the environment was modeled
from the cell block of a prison located in the northwest United States.
• Physical Component Effects: The physical effects of the locks and lights
can be operated through the HMI controls and by physically pressing the lock
control buttons in the case.
• Realistic Industrial Network Traffic Generation: The network traffic be-
tween the HMI workstation, engineering workstation and PLC is visible on the
network and constitutes realistic ICS traffic using real industrial protocol com-
munication including Ethernet/IP, CIP and the proprietary Omron protocol.
• Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options: All machines on the network
can be physically disconnected from their Ethernet ports.
• Filtering Capabilities: Using an Ubiquiti EdgeRouterX router filtering can
be done using simple firewall rules for any network connection in the environ-
ment.
• Real Malware or Attack Scripts: The PLC is vulnerable to a variety of
attacks over the network making this model of PLC a useful tool for training.
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• Real Time View of Physical Signal Exchange: Using Y-Box technology,
an exercise administrator can view the operation of the process control end-
points and the HMI to track an ongoing attack or to view real time effects of
an attack (see Figure 8).
• Remote Administrative Monitoring: The White Cell interface for the en-
vironment can be viewed using VNC technology.
• Remote Participation: Remote participation can be completed using remote
access tools, however the capabilities of physical manipulation would be hin-
dered.
Figure 6. Level 3 prison training environment.
3.4.4.3 Power Substation Environment.
A power substation level 3 environment was constructed using a feeder protection
relay and a power meter. These components have power that flows through them
and cuts the power supply if the voltage or current becomes too high based on a
designated limit. The power flows to three logically separated outlets where the
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Figure 7. HMI for the prison training environment.
Figure 8. Administrative monitoring view of the prison exercise environment.
voltage on each outlet is displayed by voltage meters and an indicator light shows
green for power or red if the power has been cut to the outlet. This environment
can be used to showcase attack and defensive measures on power monitoring devices
currently deployed as part of the national infrastructure. An example scenario that
can be implemented into this environment would be the defense against and attack
that alters the measurement of voltage and causes the relay to cut power supply to
the outlets. This environment is valued at an estimated $16,500 due primarily to the
cost of the SEL power relay and Schnieder power meter.
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Level 3 Example Scenario: Power Substation System Failure.
• Objective: Restore the power output to the outlets in the substation.
• Description: Using network traffic monitoring, HMI monitoring and visual mon-
itoring the trainee must understand when the system fails and successfully re-
cover the system by blocking access from the attacker and implement emergency
procedures to restore the failed control hardware to normal functionality.
• Type: Loss of system control and functionality.
• Evaluation Criteria: Return the system to normal functionality within three
hours and find the source of the attack within one hour.
• Reference: SEL-751A Feeder Protection Relay manual, Schneider Electric Pow-
erLogic PM5300 Power and Energy Meter manual, vulnerability reports of the
control hardware and a map of the control network.
Level 3 Power Substation Environment Components.
• Control Hardware: An SEL-751A Feeder Protection Relay and a Schneider
Electric PowerLogic PM5300 Power and Energy Meter were used as the real
vendor supplied control hardware for this training environment (Figure 9).
• Engineering Software: The Schneider Electric PowerLogic PM5300 uses ION
Setup 3.0 as the configuration software. The Engineering software for the SEL-
751A Feeder Protection Relay is the SEL-5030 AcSELerator QuickSet Software.
• HMI Software: The PowerLogic PM5300 uses a screen interface that is built
into the front of the device. The SEL-751A Feeder Protection Relay uses the
SEL-5030 AcSELerator QuickSet Software which has a built-in HMI view for
the relay.
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• Physical Component Effects: The power outlets in the environment are
functional with power flowing through the feeder relay and the power meter to
ensure the voltage and amperage stay within a specified range. If the range is
surpassed, power will be cut to the outlets providing a real physical effect in
the environment
• Realistic Industrial Network Traffic Generation: The network traffic
between the HMI workstation, power relay and power meter provide realistic
industrial network traffic with Modbus and DNP3 protocol capabilities.
• Physical Disconnect or Isolation Options: All machines on the network
can be physically disconnected from their Ethernet ports and network isola-
tion can be achieved through whitelist and blacklist capabilities of a Netgear
ProSAFE network switch.
• Filtering Capabilities: Using an Ubiquiti EdgeRouterX router filtering can
be done using simple firewall rules for any network connection in the environ-
ment.
• Varied Industrial Control Vendor Exposure: There is varied exposure
to industrial components for trainees in this environment due to the use of a
SEL Feeder Protection Relay component and a Schneider Electric Power Meter
component.
3.4.5 Construction of Level 4 ICS Training Environments.
A Level 4 training environment corresponds to the “Creating” level of Bloom’s
Taxonomy by presenting a trainee with a fully realistic scenario that enables the
trainee to use all of their skills and knowledge to produce new solutions to unique
and complex problems. Consider a power distribution plant, a scenario for a Level 4
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Figure 9. Level 3 power substation training environment.
environment would be the appearance of unusual traffic combined with unexplained
fluctuations of power. Given the complexity of the environment with many compo-
nents and connections, a trainee would have to be able to appropriately plan their
response by prioritizing components on the network, narrow down the root cause
of the malicious behavior and apply fixes to stop the incident and fully recover the
system. With many signs of the incident resulting from a cascading effect within a
real system, it can be difficult to determine the root cause of the incident and craft
an appropriate response. With most industrial systems being uniquely constructed
environments, the response of the trainee must be tailored to the environment. The
components to construct a Level 4 power plant environment would be similar to that
of an existing functional plant, however, additional engineering would be necessary to
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Figure 10. Power substation training environment programming software.
facilitate exercise control and monitoring. A Level 4 training environment may not
be suitable to train beginners due to the risk of facility damage if an exercise does not
go as intended. Instead, Level 1 and Level 2 environments can provide safe sandboxes
for beginners to make mistakes and learn basic practices. Failsafe plans should also
be considered when engineering a Level 4 environment for unpredictable situations
during an exercise that could lead to facility damage. The cost of constructing a Level
4 power plant can vary widely from millions of dollars to over a billion. This Level
4 training environment is certainly not a mobile training platform, however, remote
access may be possible.
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Figure 11. Power substation training environment monitoring HMI software.
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IV. Conclusions
This chapter summarizes conclusions of the previous chapters.
4.1 Conclusions of Research
This thesis presents five categories of training environments that leverage Bloom’s
Taxonomy to address various levels of cognitive complexity for ICS cyber first respon-
ders. A categorization of training environments that provide complexity progression is
necessary for ensuring the readiness and education of first responders. The proposed
categories help determine which training environment best aligns with an organiza-
tion’s training goals. Examples of environments for each category level are presented
with exercise scenario examples. Three Level 3 environments were constructed and
deployed for training purposes to further solidify the proposed example concepts.
Level 1 environments may be appropriate for the average plant operator, while a
Level 4 environment may be necessary for ICS cyber first responders that are called
to handle a power plant incident. This will help prevent future incidences of improper
response like the West, Texas fertilizer plant fire that could potentially involve a loss
of life.
4.1.1 Significance of Research.
The successful construction and application of Level 3 environments confirms the
hypothesis of attributing skill assessment capabilities to hardware and software com-
ponents of training environments. The categorization of environments and component
framework provide organizations the ability to understand levels of realistic fidelity
within training environments and construct environments that target desired skill
sets.
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4.1.2 Recommendations for Future Research.
The recommendations are insights gained from the experience of this research.
4.1.2.1 Establishment of Environment Certification Authority.
This research presented in this thesis has served as a first step towards official
regulation and certification of ICS training environments for incident responders.
The creation of a governing authority that has the ability to certify environments
as a designated level will allow organizations to train their incident responders to a
certified level of proficiency. In the same way that organizations like the EASA certify
flight simulators in order to guarantee a quality level of training for the pilots, research
for the creation of a similar organization can provide a solidified categorization and
provide the basis for trainee certification.
4.1.2.2 Categorization of ICS First Response Curriculum.
While this thesis focuses on the categorization of training environments, a strong
curriculum is also necessary to ensure adequate training and education while lever-
aging the environments. A standardization of ICS cyber incident response training
curriculum is the next step to establishing standardized and certified classes in this
domain.
4.1.2.3 Establishment of Common Scenarios for Evaluation.
Exercise evaluation scenarios enable the assessment of trainees and standardiza-
tion of assessment which guarantees a minimum level of proficiency demands that
common elements of exercise scenarios be established in order to assess a baseline
of knowledge and capabilities. Future research can establish a framework to create
common scenarios and assessment practices in the ICS incident response domain.
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Appendix A. Wastewater Environment Y-Box
Communication and Interface Code
This code was used to run the Y-Box interface of the aeration basin model of the
wastewater treatment facility environment. This code simulates the aeration basin
process and executes the experiment by automatically running trials with different
experiment factors. The code is broken into three parts including the main interface
code, Y-Box communication engine code, and code that controls the fan displays.
1.1 Wastewater Interface and Y-Box Communication Code
This code simulates the aeration basin process and presents a user interface dis-
playing all data being provided by the Y-Box.
import pygame
from pygame . locals import ∗
import time
import thread
import Ybox
import math
#
################################################################
# Author : Evan Plumley and Andrew Chaves
#
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# This program i s the comminication engine f o r the Y−box and
the GUI
# fo r monitor ing and powering the p h y s i c a l wastewater system
#
#
#
################################################################
class WwtSim :
def i n i t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . running = True
s e l f . s c r e en = None
s e l f . s i z e = s e l f . width , s e l f . he ight = 1450 , 850
s e l f . ybox = Ybox . Ybox ( )
s e l f . e r a se w id th = 140
s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t = 35
s e l f . v f d sp i n = True
#############################################
# Chaves I n i t i a l i z a t i o n Code
#AI 0
#DI 1
#AO 2
#DO 3
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#Fan 1 (3 ,0)
#Fan 0 (3 ,1)
#Low Le f t (3 ,3) ORP
#High Le f t (2 ,1) ORP
#Low Right (3 ,5)
#High Right (3 ,4)
#Top(3 ,6) )
#I n i t i a l i z e D i s so l v ed Oxygen and ORP and send to PLC
DO=2.0
ORP=−20
#Convert ORP (−50 to +50 s c a l e ) to something the ybox can use
(0−4095)
ORP=ORP+150
#I n i t i a l Valve Pos i t i on s
Aerobic Valve=50
Anaerobic Valve=50
#Sca le f o r sending DO ( Converts 0−4 and 0−100) to ybox va l u e s
Scale DO=math . c e i l (4095/7)
Scale ORP=math . c e i l (4095/700)
Sca l e Va lve s=math . c e i l (4095/100)
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#Sca l e s and ca s t s as an i n t DO, ORP, and Valves
Send DO=int (DO∗Scale DO )
Send ORP=int (ORP∗Scale ORP )
Send Aerobic Valve=Sca l e Va lve s ∗Aerobic Valve
Send Anaerobic Valve=Sca l e Va lve s ∗Anaerobic Valve
Fan 1=0
Fan 2=0
#Let i t f l y
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 0 , Send DO)
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 4 , Send ORP)
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 2 , Send Aerobic Valve )
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 3 , Send Anaerobic Valve )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 0 , Fan 1 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 1 , Fan 2 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 2 , 0 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 3 , 0 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 4 , 0 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 5 , 0 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 6 , 0 )
#What are we sending to the YBOX?
print ( ’ DO In i t i a l : ’ , Send DO)
print ( ’ \nORP Init ia l : ’ , Send ORP)
print ( ’ \ nSend Ae r ob i c Va l v e In i t i a l : ’ , Send Aerobic Valve )
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print ( ’ \ nSend Anaerob i c Va lve In i t i a l : ’ ,
Send Anaerobic Valve )
#Te l l the i n f i n i t e loop be low what the i n t i a l i z e d va l u e s are
. . . ( Set them as the s t a r t i n g va l u e s )
s e l f . In i t i a l DO=Send DO
s e l f . In i t ia l ORP=Send ORP
In i t i a l A e r o b i c Va l v e=Send Aerobic Valve
In i t i a l Ana e r ob i c Va l v e=Send Anaerobic Valve
#
########################################################################
#I n i t i a l i z e screen
print ( ”Waste Water Monitor Running” )
pygame . i n i t ( )
s e l f . f on t = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 25)
s e l f . f ont2 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 25)
s e l f . f ont3 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 35)
s e l f . f ont4 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 20)
pygame . d i sp l a y . s e t c a p t i o n ( ’Waste Water Treatment Monitor ’ )
s e l f . s c r e en = pygame . d i sp l a y . set mode ( s e l f . s i z e , pygame .
HWSURFACE | pygame .DOUBLEBUF)
s e l f . s c r e en . f i l l ( ( white ) )
s e l f . s c r e en . s e t c o l o r k e y ( white )
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s e l f . f an width = 300
s e l f . oxygen content = 20
#add PLC output t i t l e
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (490 , −5, 500 , 55) , 2)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ’ Sensor Data Output ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (590 , 5) )
#d i v i d e r l i n e and input t i t l e
pygame . draw . l i n e ( s e l f . screen , black , (0 ,630) , (1450 ,630) , 2)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (435 , 630 , 600 , 50) , 2)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ’PLC Output to Sensor s ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (560 , 635) )
#add the fans
s e l f . fan1cord = (25 ,150)
s e l f . fan2cord = (325 ,150)
s e l f . fan1 = pygame . image . load ( ”wwtimages/ fanBlade . jpg ” )
s e l f . fan2 = pygame . image . load ( ”wwtimages/ fanBlade . jpg ” )
s e l f . fan1 . s e t c o l o r k e y ( ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) )
s e l f . fan2 . s e t c o l o r k e y ( ( 0 , 0 , 0 ) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . fan1 , s e l f . fan1cord )
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s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . fan2 , s e l f . fan2cord )
#add fan t i t l e s
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’Oxygen Blower System ’ ,
True , ( black ) ) , (170 , 95) )
#add r e c t a n g l e s f o r fan speed d i s p l a y and t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’VFD Hz ’ , True , ( black ) ) ,
(230 , 390) )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (210 , 425 , 150 , 45) ,
5)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( ’ 50 ’ , True , ( red ) ) , (255 ,
435) )
#add the p ipe v a l v e s
s e l f . p ipe1cord = (700 ,140)
s e l f . p ipe2cord = (1050 ,140)
s e l f . p ipe1 = pygame . image . load ( ”wwtimages/ pipe . png” )
s e l f . p ipe2 = pygame . image . load ( ”wwtimages/ pipe . png” )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . pipe1 , s e l f . p ipe1cord )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . pipe2 , s e l f . p ipe2cord )
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#add va l v e t i t l e s
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’ Diso lved Oxygen Valve ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (705 , 95) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’Oxygen Reduction Valve ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (1050 , 95) )
#add r e c t a n g l e s and l a b e l s to d i s p l a y va l v e open percentage
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’ Percentage Open ’ , True , (
black ) ) , (740 , 390) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’ Percentage Open ’ , True , (
black ) ) , (1100 , 390) )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (750 , 425 , 150 , 45) ,
5)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (1110 , 425 , 150 , 45)
, 5)
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t2 . render ( ’50 ’ , True , ( d a r k b l u e ) )
, (800 , 435) )
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t2 . render ( ’100 ’ , True , ( d a r k b l u e )
) , (1160 , 435) )
#oxygen content ORP d i s p l a y
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’ Diso lved Oxygen (mg/L) : ’
, True , ( b lack ) ) , (680 , 480) )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (680 , 510 , 50 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , green , (730 , 510 , 230 , 75) , 0)
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pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (960 , 510 , 20 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (680 , 510 , 300 , 75) , 2)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’Oxygen Reduction (mV) : ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (1050 , 480) )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (1035 , 510 , 50 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , green , (1085 , 510 , 230 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (1315 , 510 , 20 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (1035 , 510 , 300 , 75) , 2)
#
########################################################################
# Add the l o g i c a l output
#
########################################################################
#add r e c t a n g l e s f o r fan speed d i s p l a y and t h e i r d e s c r i p t i o n s
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’PLC Hz ’ , True , ( black ) ) ,
(230 , 715) )
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pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (210 , 745 , 150 , 45) ,
5)
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t2 . render ( ’50 ’ , True , ( red ) ) ,
(115 , 755) )
#add r e c t a n g l e s and l a b e l s to d i s p l a y va l v e open percentage
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’ Percentage Open ’ , True , (
black ) ) , (740 , 715) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ’ Percentage Open ’ , True , (
black ) ) , (1100 , 715) )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (750 , 745 , 150 , 45) ,
5)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , dark grey , (1110 , 745 , 150 , 45)
, 5)
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t2 . render ( ’50 ’ , True , ( d a r k b l u e ) )
, (800 , 755) )
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t2 . render ( ’100 ’ , True , ( d a r k b l u e )
) , (1160 , 755) )
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pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
try :
thread . s t a r t new thread ( timedReads , ( s e l f , ) )
thread . s t a r t new thread ( spinFans , ( s e l f , ) )
except Exception as e :
print ( e )
s e l f . running = True
#Handle a l l e v en t s
def on event ( s e l f , event ) :
i f event . type == pygame .QUIT:
s e l f . running = Fal se
else : #Determine i f but ton was c l i c k e d
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
def on loop ( s e l f ) :
pass
def on render ( s e l f ) :
pass
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def on cleanup ( s e l f ) :
pygame . qu i t ( )
#s t a r t program
def on execute ( s e l f ) :
#i f s e l f . o n i n i t ( ) == False :
#s e l f . running = Fa l se
while ( s e l f . running ) :
for event in pygame . event . get ( ) :
s e l f . on event ( event )
s e l f . on loop ( )
s e l f . on render ( )
s e l f . on cleanup ( )
def spinFans ( s e l f ) :
ro tat ionDegree1 = 2 #ro ta t i on degrees f o r each fan
ro tat ionDegree2 = 2
past = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g s t a r t i n g
mi l i second time to execu te reads from the ybox
while True :
p r e sen t = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g pre s en t
time to comapre to pas t
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#check to see i f 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s have passed
i f pre sent − past >= 40 :
past = pre sent
########################
#ro ta t e the fans
#############################
ro tat ionDegree1 = rotat ionDegree1 % 360 #ro ta t i on degree f o r
fan 1
ro tat ionDegree2 = rotat ionDegree2 % 360 #ro ta t i on degree f o r
fan 2
##conduct the a c tua l movements
i f s e l f . v f d sp i n :
newFan1 = r o t c e n t e r ( s e l f . fan1 , ro tat ionDegree1 )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t (newFan1 , s e l f . fan1cord )
newFan2 = r o t c e n t e r ( s e l f . fan2 , ro tat ionDegree2 )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t (newFan2 , s e l f . fan2cord )
rotat ionDegree1 = rotat ionDegree1 + 10 #move the dwgrees
ro tat ionDegree2 = rotat ionDegree2 + 10 #move the dwgrees
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#method to monitor the PLC and chnage the d i s p l a y accord ing l y
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def timedReads ( s e l f ) :
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
past = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g s t a r t i n g
mi l i second time to execu te reads from the ybox
ro tat ionDegree1 = 2 #ro ta t i on degrees f o r each fan
ro tat ionDegree2 = 2
#waterS i ze1 = 1
#waterS i ze2 = 100
oxyBarPos = 0
reduct i on = 0
while True :
p r e sen t = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g pre s en t
time to comapre to pas t
#check to see i f 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s have passed
i f pre sent − past >= 100 :
past = pre sent
#Read the Se tpo in t f o r DO and ORP from PLC
DO Set Point=( s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 0 ) ∗(1/(4095/7) ) )
ORP Set Point=( s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 3 ) ∗(1/(4095/700) ) )
#Read the output (%) o f the PIDs c o n t r o l l i n g the VFD and
Valves
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Valve Aerobic Percent Output=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 4 ) #va l v e
percenatge
Valve Anaerobic Percent Output=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 5 )
Frequency Percent Increase=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 2 )
#Sca le v a l v e s and VFD speed va l u e s to 0−100, why i s i t 200?
z e r o t o hun s c a l e =100/4095
Frequency Sca le =60/4095#100/4095
#Use the Sca le
##############################################
#Disp lay Frequecny sent to the VFP from the PLC
##############################################
Frequency Per cent Inc r ea se Sca l ed=(Frequency Percent Increase
∗Frequency Sca le ) #0−60
print ( ”PLC Freq\n” , Frequency Percent Increase )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (215 , 750 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( ”%.4 f ” %
Frequency Per cent Inc r ea se Sca l ed , True , ( red ) ) , (235 ,
755) ) #d i s p l a y s 0−60 s c a l e
###################################
#Disp lay Aerobic Valve updates
##################################
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Valve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led=int (
Valve Aerobic Percent Output ∗ z e r o t o hun s c a l e ) # Aerobic
v a l v e open percentage
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . pipe1 , s e l f . p ipe1cord )
pygame . draw . c i r c l e ( s e l f . screen , blue , (830 ,265) ,
Va lve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (753 , 428 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( str (
Va lve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led ) , True , ( dark b lue ) ) ,
(800 , 435) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
###################################
#Disp lay Anerobic Valve updates
##################################
Valve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led=int (
Valve Anaerobic Percent Output∗ z e r o t o hun s c a l e )# =
Anerobic v a l v e open perce tage
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . pipe2 , s e l f . p ipe2cord )
pygame . draw . c i r c l e ( s e l f . screen , blue , (1177 ,265) ,
Va lve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (1115 , 430 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( str (
Va lve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led ) , True , ( dark b lue )
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) , (1160 , 435) )
#Print Valve p o s i t i o n s and VFD speed
#pr in t ( ’ Aerobic Valve Percent : ’ ,
Va lve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
#pr i n t ( ’\ nAnaerobic Valve Percent : ’ ,
Va lve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
#pr i n t ( ’\nVFD Speed Percent : ’ ,
F requency Percen t Inc rea se Sca l ed )
#Send the va l v e p o s i t i o n s to the 3−10V meters and d i s p l a y to
the GUI
#Log i ca l Output to v a l v e s
##########################################
#Output to v a l v e s
Aerob i c Va lve Sca l ed D i sp l ay=Valve Aerobic Percent Output
Anaerob ic Va lve Sca led Disp lay=Valve Anaerobic Percent Output
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 2 , Aerob i c Va lve Sca l ed D i sp l ay )
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 3 , Anaerob ic Va lve Sca led Disp lay )
#d i s p l a y the ou tpu t s to the meter
Valve Anaerob ic meter d i sp lay=int (
Anaerob ic Va lve Sca led Disp lay ∗ z e r o t o hun s c a l e )# =
Anerobic v a l v e open perce tage
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Va lve Aerob i c mete r d i sp l ay=int ( Aerob i c Va lve Sca l ed D i sp l ay ∗
z e r o t o hun s c a l e )# =Anerobic v a l v e open perce tage
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (760 , 750 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (1120 , 750 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( str (
Va lve Aerob i c mete r d i sp l ay ) , True , ( dark b lue ) ) , (800 ,
755) ) #aerob i c
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( str (
Va lve Anaerob ic meter d i sp lay ) , True , ( dark b lue ) ) ,
(1160 , 755) ) #anerob ic
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
################Decrease DO AND ORP#################
#Sub t rac t percentage o f v a l v e s from 100 and use t h a t to
determine how much to lower DO and ORP
#The more anaerob ic the water , the lower ORP and DO both are
DO Subtract=(101−Valve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
ORP Subtract=(101−Valve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
#Sub t rac t the v a l u e s and d i v i d e by two to make the change
l e s s a g r e s s i v e ( h e l p s the PIDs)
DO Update=int ( s e l f . In i t ia l DO −(DO Subtract /8) )
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ORP Update=int ( s e l f . In i t ia l ORP−(ORP Subtract /8) )
#Update the prev i ous oxygen va lue so next time through the
loop we are s u b t r a c t i n g from the most r e cen t c o r r e c t va lue
s e l f . In i t i a l DO=DO Update
s e l f . In i t ia l ORP=ORP Update
#Let i t f l y
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 0 ,DO Update )
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 4 ,ORP Update )
################INCREASE DO AND ORP#################
#Increase DO and ORP i f v a l v e s are opening accord ing to
equat ion
Slope Up DO=.15
Slope Up ORP=.15
#Mul t i p l y the v a l v e percentage by a s lope , add t h i s va lue to
prev i ous DO and ORP va l u e s
DO Update=s e l f . In i t i a l DO+(Slope Up DO∗
Valve Aerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
ORP Update=s e l f . In i t ia l ORP+(Slope Up ORP∗
Valve Anaerob ic Percent Output Sca led )
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#Update the prev i ous DO and ORP va l u e s so next time through
the loop we are adding to the co r r e c t va lue
s e l f . In i t i a l DO=DO Update
s e l f . In i t ia l ORP=ORP Update
#Cast as an i n t e g e r f o r the YBOX’ s sake
DO Update=int (DO Update )
ORP Update=int (ORP Update )
#Show what i s be ing sent
print ( ’ \nDO Update : ’ , DO Update )
print ( ’ \nORP Update : ’ , ORP Update )
#l e t DO and ORP f l y
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 0 ,DO Update )
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 4 ,ORP Update )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#################################
# add and update oxygen l e v e l bar
#################################
#oxyBarPos = oxyBarPos % 300
#oxyContent = oxyBarPos / 75 # t h i s i s between 0 and 4
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#reduc t i on = ( oxyBarPos / 3) − 50 # reduc t i on i s between −50
and 50
#d i s o l v e d oxygen
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (910 , 480 , 80 , 30) , 0)
i f (DO Update / (4095/7) ) > 1 and (DO Update / (4095/7) ) <
5 . 5 :
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ”%.4 f ” % (DO Update /
(4095/7) ) , True , ( dark green ) ) , (910 , 480) )
else :
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ”%.4 f ” % (DO Update /
(4095/7) ) , True , ( red ) ) , (910 , 480) )
oxyBarPos = (DO Update / (4095/7) ) ∗ 42 .85
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (680 , 510 , 40 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , green , (720 , 510 , 180 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (915 , 510 , 45 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (680 , 510 , 300 , 75) , 2)
i f oxyBarPos >= 0 and oxyBarPos <= 300 :
pygame . draw . l i n e ( s e l f . screen , black , ( oxyBarPos + 680 ,510) , (
oxyBarPos + 680 , 510+75) , 6)
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#oxygen reduc t i on
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (1270 , 480 , 120 , 30) , 0)
i f ( (ORP Update / (4095/700) ) − 150) > −30 and ( (ORP Update /
(4095/700) ) − 150) < 450 :
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s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ”%.4 f ” % ( (ORP Update /
(4095/700) ) − 150) , True , ( dark green ) ) , (1270 , 480) )
else :
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f on t . render ( ”%.4 f ” % ( (ORP Update /
(4095/700) ) − 150) , True , ( red ) ) , (1270 , 480) )
orpOxyBarPos = (ORP Update / (4095/700) ) ∗ . 4 3
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (1035 , 510 , 50 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , green , (1085 , 510 , 210 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , red , (1295 , 510 , 40 , 75) , 0)
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (1035 , 510 , 300 , 75) , 2)
i f orpOxyBarPos >= 0 and orpOxyBarPos <= 300 :
pygame . draw . l i n e ( s e l f . screen , black , ( orpOxyBarPos +
1035 ,510) , ( orpOxyBarPos + 1035 , 510+75) , 6)
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
##############GET TOTAL VALVE POSITION ##################
#Get the t o t a l v a l v e p o s i t i o n (0−200) : ( Anaerobic (100) +
Aerobic (100) = 200 Tota l )
Tota l Va lve Pos i t i on=int ( Valve Aerobic Percent Output+
Valve Anaerobic Percent Output )
Tota l Va lve Sca l e =200/4095
#Print the Tota l Valve Pos i t i on
print ( ’ \nTota l va lve : ’ , To ta l Va lve Pos i t i on ∗
Tota l Va lve Sca l e )
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#Let the Tota l Valve p o s i t i o n f l y
s e l f . ybox . sendAnWrite (2 , 5 , To ta l Va lve Pos i t i on )
##############GET VFD TRUE SPEED ##################
#Get the VFD’ s d i r e c t output from the Ybox f o r i t s speed NOTE
: the VFD must be running ! ! ! ! , not j u s t on ! ! !
True Frequency=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (0 , 6 )
print ( ”True Frequency Raw” , True Frequency )
#Convert the s i g n a l to 0−60 he r t z
True Frequency Sca led=True Frequency ∗(60/4095)
i f True Frequency Sca led < 5 :
s e l f . v f d sp i n = Fal se
else :
s e l f . v f d sp i n = True
###############################
# Disp lay t rue f requency to gui
###########################
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (215 , 430 , s e l f .
e ra se width , s e l f . e r a s e h e i g h t ) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont2 . render ( ”%.4 f ” %
True Frequency Sca led , True , ( red ) ) , (255 , 435) )
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pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#Print the t rue VFD frequency
print ( ’ \nTrue VFD Frequency : ’ , True Frequency Sca led )
#Sta r t fans i f the VFD i s runnning
i f True Frequency Sca led > 5 :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 0 , 1 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 1 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 0 , 0 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 1 , 0 )
#Print d i v i d e r f o r next time through loop
print ( ’######################################\n ’ )
#########Obtain Alarms , check alarms , send to l i g h t i f
necessary######
DO High=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 0 )
i f DO High==1:
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 4 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 4 , 0 )
DO Low=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 1 )
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i f DO Low==1:
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 5 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 5 , 0 )
ORP High=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 5 )
i f ORP High==1:
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 2 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 2 , 0 )
ORP Low=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 3 )
i f ORP Low==1:
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 3 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 3 , 0 )
Pressure High=s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 4 )
i f Pressure High==1:
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 6 , 1 )
else :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (3 , 6 , 0 )
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#
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !
########################
#ro ta t e the fans
#############################
#rota t ionDegree1 = rota t ionDegree1 % 360 #ro ta t i on degree f o r
fan 1
#rota t ionDegree2 = rota t ionDegree2 % 360 #ro ta t i on degree f o r
fan 2
##conduct the a c tua l movements
#i f s e l f . v f d s p i n :
# newFan1 = ro t c e n t e r ( s e l f . fan1 , ro ta t ionDegree1 )
# s e l f . s creen . b l i t (newFan1 , s e l f . fan1cord )
# newFan2 = ro t c e n t e r ( s e l f . fan2 , ro ta t ionDegree2 )
# s e l f . s creen . b l i t (newFan2 , s e l f . fan2cord )
# pygame . d i s p l a y . update ()
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#rota t ionDegree1 = rota t ionDegree1 + 10 #move the dwgrees
#rota t ionDegree2 = rota t ionDegree2 + 10 #move the dwgrees
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
def r o t c e n t e r ( image , ang le ) :
””” ro t a t e an image wh i l e keep ing i t s c en te r and s i z e ”””
o r i g r e c t = image . g e t r e c t ( )
ro t image = pygame . transform . r o t a t e ( image , ang le )
r o t r e c t = o r i g r e c t . copy ( )
r o t r e c t . c en t e r = rot image . g e t r e c t ( ) . c en t e r
ro t image = rot image . subsur f a ce ( r o t r e c t ) . copy ( )
rot image = rot image . conver t ( )
return ro t image
i f name == ” ma in ” :
red = (225 , 0 , 0 )
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
blue = (130 , 130 , 255)
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dark b lue = (0 , 0 , 150)
green = (0 ,240 , 0 )
dark green = (0 ,175 , 0 )
wwtSim = WwtSim( )
wwtSim . on execute ( )
1.2 Y-Box Communication Engine
This code enables messages to be sent to and received from the Y-Box.
import time
import msvcrt
from pygame . locals import ∗
import s e r i a l
import thread
#
########################################################################
# Author : Evan Plumley
# Date : 6/20/2016
# ver s i on : 1 .0
#
#The Ybox c l a s s
# dependencies : pygame , p y s e r i a l
#
########################################################################
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class Ybox( object ) :
def i n i t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s e r = s e r i a l . S e r i a l (
port= ’COM4’ ,
baudrate=115200 ,
pa r i ty=s e r i a l .PARITY NONE,
s t o pb i t s=s e r i a l .STOPBITS ONE,
by t e s i z e=s e r i a l .EIGHTBITS,
t imeout = 1
)
time . s l e ep (1 )
print ( ” I n i t i a l i z e Complete” )
def readLine ( s e l f ) :
l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
return l i n e
def sendRead ( s e l f , s l o t , channel ) :
msg = ”R” + str ( s l o t ) + ” , ” + str ( channel ) + ”\n”
s e l f . s e r . wr i t e (msg . encode ( ) )
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l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
#Give me an i n t e g e r
s p l i t=l i n e . s p l i t ( ’ , ’ )
l i n e=s p l i t [ 2 ]
l i n e=int ( l i n e , 1 6 )
return l i n e
def sendAnRead( s e l f , s l o t , channel ) :
msg = ”R” + str ( s l o t ) + ” , ” + str ( channel ) + ”\n”
s e l f . s e r . wr i t e (msg . encode ( ) )
l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
return l i n e
def sendWrite ( s e l f , s l o t , channel , va lue ) :
msg = ”W” + str ( s l o t ) + ” , ” + str ( channel ) + ” , ” + str ( va lue )
+ ”\n”
s e l f . s e r . wr i t e (msg . encode ( ) )
l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
return l i n e
def sendAnWrite ( s e l f , s l o t , channel , va lue ) :
msg = ”W” + str ( s l o t ) + ” , ” + str ( channel ) + ” , ” + str ( va lue )
+ ”\n”
s e l f . s e r . wr i t e (msg . encode ( ) )
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l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
return l i n e
def readAl l ( s e l f , s l o t ) :
s l o t s t r = str ( s l o t )
msg = ’R1 ’ + s l o t s t r + ’A ’
s e l f . s e r . wr i t e (msg . encode ( ) )
l i n e = s e l f . s e r . r e a d l i n e ( ) . decode ( )
l i n e = l i n e . s t r i p ( )
return l i n e
1.3 Wastewater Blower fan interface control
This code enables the image processing and movement of the wastewater blower
fan for the display interface of the environment.
import pygame
from pygame . locals import ∗
import pygbutton
class BlowerFan :
def i n i t ( s e l f , sim=None , fan num=0, x=0,y=0) :
i f sim i s not None :
#load the fan onto the screen
s e l f . fan num = fan num
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s e l f . fan image = pygame . image . load ( ”wwtimages/ fanBlade . jpg ” )
sim . sc r een . b l i t ( fan image , (x , y ) )
def r o t a t e ( s e l f ) :
pygame . transform . r o t a t e ( s e l f . fan image , 3)
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Appendix B. Prison Environment Y-Box Communication
and Interface Code
This code was used to run the Y-Box interface of the prison block model environ-
ment. This code reads and displays the status of the doors, locks and push buttons
of the environment. The Y-Box communication engine shown in Appendix A is also
used during the execution of this code.
2.1 Prison Interface and Y-Box Communication Code
This portion of the code controls the interface as a whole and updates the display
while reading and writing to the Y-Box.
from pygame . locals import ∗
import gua rd s ta t i on
import p r i s o n c e l l
import time
import thread
import Ybox
import mantrap
import i n d i c a t o r
#
################################################################
# Authors : Evan Plumley and J e f f Guion
#
# This programruns the pr i son c e l l s imu la t i on d i s p l a y i n g the
va lue
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# of the PLC outpu t s and prov id ing the PLC inpu t s
#
#
#
################################################################
class PrisonSim :
def i n i t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . running = True
s e l f . s c r e en = None
s e l f . s i z e = s e l f . width , s e l f . he ight = 1400 , 950
s e l f . ybox = Ybox . Ybox ( )
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 = Fal se
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 = Fal se
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 = Fal se
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 = Fal se
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le1 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le2 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le3 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le4 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le5 = Fal se
def o n i n i t ( s e l f ) :
#I n i t i a l i z e screen
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pygame . i n i t ( )
s e l f . f on t = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 25)
pygame . d i sp l a y . s e t c a p t i o n ( ’Ybox Simulat ion ’ )
s e l f . s c r e en = pygame . d i sp l a y . set mode ( s e l f . s i z e , pygame .
HWSURFACE | pygame .DOUBLEBUF)
s e l f . s c r e en . f i l l ( ( b lack ) )
x padding = 42 .5
y padding = 95
c e l l p a n e l w i d t h = 325
c e l l p a n e l h e i g h t = 300
#crea te the guard s t a t i o n pane l wi th number o f c e l l s
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l = guard s ta t i on . GuardStation ( s e l f ,
5 , 50 , 575)
#crea te each c e l l a t g i ven l o c a t i o n
c e l l o n e p a n e l = p r i s o n c e l l . Pr i sonCe l l ( s e l f , 1 , x padding ,
y padding )
c e l l two pan e l = p r i s o n c e l l . Pr i sonCe l l ( s e l f , 2 , 5∗ x padding+
ce l l p ane l w id th , y padding )
c e l l t h r e e p a n e l = p r i s o n c e l l . Pr i sonCe l l ( s e l f , 3 , 9∗
x padding+2∗ c e l l p ane l w id th , y padding )
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#add a l l c e l l s to l i s t
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s = [ c e l l o n e p an e l , c e l l two pane l ,
c e l l t h r e e p a n e l ]
#add mantrap d i s p l a y
s e l f . mantrap = mantrap .ManTrap( s e l f , 3∗ x padding+2∗
c e l l p ane l w id th , ( 2 . 2 ∗ y padding ) + c e l l p a n e l h e i g h t )
#add the t i t l e o f the program
ma in t i t l e d imen s i on s = ( (615 , 70) )
ma i n t i t l e i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / t i t l e . png” )
ma i n t i t l e i c o n 2 = pygame . image . load ( ” images / t i t l e . png” )
ma i n t i t l e i c o n s = [ ma i n t i t l e i c o n , ma i n t i t l e i c o n 2 ]
ma i n t i t l e = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 390 , 10 ,
ma i n t i t l e i c o n s , ma in t i t l e d imen s i on s )
# se t the i n i t a l s t a t e s
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 9 , 1 ) #panel enab led
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 0 , 1 ) #l i g h t i n d i c a t o r s green
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , 1 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 1 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 10 , 1 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 11 , 1 )
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pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
try :
thread . s t a r t new thread ( timedReads , ( s e l f , ) )
except Exception as e :
print ( e )
s e l f . running = True
#Handle a l l e v en t s
def on event ( s e l f , event ) :
i f event . type == pygame .QUIT:
s e l f . running = Fal se
else : #Determine i f but ton was c l i c k e d
for i , c e l l b t n in enumerate ( s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
c e l l b t n s ) :
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in c e l l b t n . handleEvent ( event ) :
try :
c l i ckButton ( s e l f , i )
except Exception as e :
print ( e )
for i , c e l l in enumerate ( s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s ) :
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in c e l l . key btn . handleEvent ( event ) :
try :
openDoor ( s e l f , i )
except Exception as e :
print ( e )
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i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s ab l e b tn .
handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d = True
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
def on loop ( s e l f ) :
pass
def on render ( s e l f ) :
pass
def on cleanup ( s e l f ) :
pygame . qu i t ( )
#s t a r t program
def on execute ( s e l f ) :
i f s e l f . o n i n i t ( ) == False :
s e l f . running = Fal se
while ( s e l f . running ) :
for event in pygame . event . get ( ) :
s e l f . on event ( event )
s e l f . on loop ( )
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s e l f . on render ( )
s e l f . on cleanup ( )
#pushes but ton f o r two seconds then r e l e a s e s i t
def c l i ckButton ( s e l f , i ) :
#door one but ton
i f i == 0 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 == False :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 = True
s e l f . but tontogg le1 = True
e l i f i == 0 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 == True :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le1 = True
#door two but ton
e l i f i == 1 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 == False :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 = True
s e l f . but tontogg le2 = True
e l i f i == 1 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 == True :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le2 = True
#door th ree but ton
e l i f i == 2 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 == False :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 = True
s e l f . but tontogg le3 = True
e l i f i == 2 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 == True :
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s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le3 = True
#door four but ton
e l i f i == 3 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 == False :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 = True
s e l f . but tontogg le4 = True
e l i f i == 3 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 == True :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le4 = True
#door f i v e but ton
e l i f i == 4 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 == False :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 = True
s e l f . but tontogg le5 = True
e l i f i == 4 and s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 == True :
s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 = Fal se
s e l f . but tontogg le5 = True
else :
print ( ”Something went wrong in the l o ck reads ” )
#method to open the door v i a the manual key but ton
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def openDoor ( s e l f , i ) :
i f s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == True :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed = Fal se
e l i f s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == False :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed = True
#method to monitor the PLC and chnage the d i s p l a y accord ing l y
def timedReads ( s e l f ) :
past = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g s t a r t i n g
mi l i second time to execu te reads from the ybox
while True :
p r e sen t = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g pre s en t
time to comapre to pas t
#check to see i f 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s have passed
i f pre sent − past >= 100 :
past = pre sent
#########################################
#se t but ton c l i k c v a l u e s and wr i t e accord ing l y
##################################################
i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 == True and s e l f . but tontogg le1 == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 1 )
s e l f . but tontogg le1 = Fal se
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e l i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck1 == False and s e l f . but tontogg le1 ==
True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 0 )
s e l f . but tontogg le1 = Fal se
i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 == True and s e l f . but tontogg le2 == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 1 )
s e l f . but tontogg le2 = Fal se
e l i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck2 == False and s e l f . but tontogg le2 ==
True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 0 )
s e l f . but tontogg le2 = Fal se
i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 == True and s e l f . but tontogg le3 == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 5 , 1 )
s e l f . but tontogg le3 = Fal se
e l i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck3 == False and s e l f . but tontogg le3 ==
True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 5 , 0 )
s e l f . but tontogg le3 = Fal se
i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 == True and s e l f . but tontogg le4 == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 7 , 1 )
s e l f . but tontogg le4 = Fal se
e l i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck4 == False and s e l f . but tontogg le4 ==
True :
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s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 7 , 0 )
s e l f . but tontogg le4 = Fal se
i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 == True and s e l f . but tontogg le5 == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 8 , 1 )
s e l f . but tontogg le5 = Fal se
e l i f s e l f . bu t tonc l i ck5 == False and s e l f . but tontogg le5 ==
True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 8 , 0 )
s e l f . but tontogg le5 = Fal se
#################################################
#read the l o c k va lue f o r a l l doors from the PLC and then
reac t
##############################################
for i in range (0 , len ( s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s ) ) :
#aqcu i r ing the a c tua l channe l number
i f i == 0 :
readnum = 0
e l i f i == 1 :
readnum = 3
e l i f i == 2 :
readnum = 6
else :
print ( ”Something went wrong in the l o ck reads ” )
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resp = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , readnum )
readnum = str ( readnum )
i f resp == (”r1 , ” + readnum + ” ,1 ” ) and s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s
[ i ] . l o ckClosed == True : #checks f o r a l o c k s t a t e change
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o c k i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( ) #open
l o c k
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o ckClosed = Fal se #loc k open s t a t e
f l a g
#make sure I dont un e c e s a r i i l y change the s t a t e due to the
manual key
i f s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == True :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed = Fal se
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
e l i f resp == (”r1 , ”+ readnum +” ,0 ” ) and s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s
[ i ] . l o ckClosed == False :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o c k i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( ) #open
l o c k
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o ckClosed = True #loc k open s t a t e
f l a g
#make sure I dont un e c e s a r i i l y change the s t a t e due to the
manual key
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i f s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == False :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed = True
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#Checking f o r chnages f o r the i nd i c a t o r l i g h t
for i in range (0 , len ( s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s ) ) :
#mapping to secure l i g h t s f o r the p l c
i f i == 0 :
writenum = 0
e l i f i == 1 :
writenum = 2
e l i f i == 2 :
writenum = 4
i f ( s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == False or s e l f .
c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o ckClosed == False ) and s e l f .
c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t == True :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )#
change to red
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = Fal se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 0 ) # turn the PLC l i g h t
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
e l i f ( s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . doorClosed == True and s e l f .
c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . l o ckClosed == True ) and s e l f .
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c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t == False :
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . c e l l d o o r i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )#
change to green
s e l f . c e l l d o o r p a n e l s [ i ] . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 1 ) # turn the PLC l i g h t
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#########################################
# read pr i son guard but ton s t a t u s e s j u s t f o r c e l l doors and
mantrap
#########################################
for i in range (0 , len ( s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . button pushed )
) :
#aqcu i r ing the a c tua l channe l number
i f i == 0 :
readnum = 1
writenum = 1
e l i f i == 1 :
readnum = 4
writenum = 3
e l i f i == 2 :
readnum = 7
writenum = 5
e l i f i == 3 :
readnum = 10
103
writenum = 7
e l i f i == 4 :
readnum = 12
writenum = 8
else :
print ( ”Something went wrong in the button reads ” )
resp2 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , readnum )
readnum = str ( readnum )
i f resp2 == (”r1 , ”+ readnum +” ,1 ” ) and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . button pushed [ i ] == False :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . b tn s t a tu s e s [ i ] . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . button pushed [ i ] = True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 1 )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
e l i f resp2 == (”r1 , ”+ readnum + ” ,0 ” ) and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . button pushed [ i ] == True :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . b tn s t a tu s e s [ i ] . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . button pushed [ i ] = Fa l se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 0 )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
###############################################
104
#Read guard s t a t i o n l i g h t s t a t u s e s
################################################
for i in range (0 , len ( s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t s ) ) :
#aqcu i r ing the a c tua l channe l number
i f i == 0 :
readnum = 2
e l i f i == 1 :
readnum = 5
e l i f i == 2 :
readnum = 8
e l i f i == 3 :
readnum = 13
else :
print ( ”Something went wrong in the button reads ” )
resp3 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , readnum )
readnum = str ( readnum )
i f resp3 == (”r1 , ”+ readnum +” ,1 ” ) and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t g r e e n [ i ] == False :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t s [ i ] . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t g r e e n [ i ] = True
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
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e l i f resp3 == (”r1 , ”+ readnum +” ,0 ” ) and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t g r e e n [ i ] == True :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t s [ i ] . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . l i g h t g r e e n [ i ] = Fa l se
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
############################################
# Read the l o c k s f o r the man trap and reac t a pp rop r i a t l e y
############################################
#loc k reads f o r trap door one
##############################
readnum = 9
writenum = 10
readnum 2 = 11
writenum 2 = 11
resp4 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , readnum )
resp5 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , readnum 2 )
readnum = str ( readnum )
readnum 2 = str ( readnum 2 )
#a l l reads done f o r both above
i f resp4 == (”r1 , ” + readnum + ” ,1 ” ) and s e l f . mantrap .
lock1Closed == True : #checks f o r a l o c k s t a t e change
s e l f . mantrap . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 1 . change s ta t e ( ) #open l o c k
s e l f . mantrap . lock1Closed = Fal se #loc k open s t a t e f l a g
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s e l f . mantrap . t rap door1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . mantrap . door1Closed = Fal se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 0 ) # trap door in unsecure
i f s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t == True :
s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = Fal se
s e l f . mantrap . s e c u r e i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
e l i f resp4 == (”r1 , ” + readnum + ” ,0 ” ) and s e l f . mantrap .
lock1Closed == False : #checks f o r a l o c k s t a t e change
s e l f . mantrap . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 1 . change s ta t e ( ) #open l o c k
s e l f . mantrap . lock1Closed = True #loc k open s t a t e f l a g
s e l f . mantrap . t rap door1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . mantrap . door1Closed = True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum , 1 ) # trap door in unsecure
i f resp5 == ”r1 , 11 , 0 ” and s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t ==
False :
s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = True
s e l f . mantrap . s e c u r e i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#loc k reads f o r trap door 2
##############################
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i f resp5 == (”r1 , ” + readnum 2 + ” ,1 ” ) and s e l f . mantrap .
lock2Closed == True : #checks f o r a l o c k s t a t e change
s e l f . mantrap . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 2 . change s ta t e ( ) #open l o c k
s e l f . mantrap . lock2Closed = Fal se #loc k open s t a t e f l a g
s e l f . mantrap . t rap door2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . mantrap . door2Closed = Fal se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum 2 , 0 ) # trap door in unsecure
i f s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t == True :
s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = Fal se
s e l f . mantrap . s e c u r e i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
e l i f resp5 == (”r1 , ” + readnum 2 + ” ,0 ” ) and s e l f . mantrap .
lock2Closed == False : #checks f o r a l o c k s t a t e change
s e l f . mantrap . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 2 . change s ta t e ( ) #open l o c k
s e l f . mantrap . lock2Closed = True #loc k open s t a t e f l a g
s e l f . mantrap . t rap door2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . mantrap . door2Closed = True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , writenum 2 , 1 ) # trap door secure
i f resp4 == ”r1 , 9 , 0 ” and s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t == False
:
s e l f . mantrap . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = True
s e l f . mantrap . s e c u r e i n d i c a t o r . change s ta t e ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
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#read the key and execu te only i f the key ho l d s the power to
do so
resp6 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 14)
i f resp6 == (”r1 , 14 , 1 ” ) and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l enab led == False and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l keyContro l == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 9 , 1 )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . enablePanel ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f resp6 == (”r1 , 14 , 0 ” ) and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l enab led == True and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l keyContro l == True :
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 9 , 0 )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i sab l ePane l ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#read the s imu la t i on d i s a b l e bu t t t on and take con t r o l power
form the key
i f s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d == True and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l enab led == False :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l = Fa l se
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d = Fal se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 9 , 1 )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . enablePanel ( )
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pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d == True and s e l f .
g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l enab led == True :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l = Fa l se
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d = Fal se
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 9 , 0 )
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . d i sab l ePane l ( )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
#return con t r o l power to the key i f the sim and key match
i f s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l == False and
resp6 == (”r1 , 14 , 1 ” ) and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l enab led == True :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l = True
i f s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l == False and
resp6 == (”r1 , 14 , 0 ” ) and s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l .
pane l enab led == False :
s e l f . g ua rd s t a t i on pane l . pane l keyContro l = True
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i f name == ” ma in ” :
green = (200 , 0 , 0 )
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
l i g h t b l u e = (0 , 0 , 255)
dark b lue = (0 , 0 , 150)
prisonSim = PrisonSim ( )
prisonSim . on execute ( )
2.2 Prison Guard Station Interface Code
This portion of the code controls the guard station display and button interface
for the prison environment.
from pygame . locals import ∗
import i n d i c a t o r
import pygbutton
class GuardStation :
def i n i t ( s e l f , sim=None , num ce l l s =0, x=0, y=0) :
i f sim :
s c r een = sim . sc r een
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f on t = sim . f ont
s e l f . c e l l b t n s = [ ]
s e l f . l i g h t s = [ ]
s e l f . b t n s t a tu s e s = [ ]
s e l f . button pushed = [ ]
s e l f . l i g h t g r e e n = [ ]
s e l f . pane l enab led = True
s e l f . pane l keyContro l = True #enab l e s the key o be over idden
s e l f . d i s a b l e c l i c k e d = Fal se
b tn he i ght = 40 ;
btn width = 100 ;
c e l l p add ing x = 25
ce l l p add ing y = 60
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
t i t l e h e i g h t = 25
l i g h t h e i g h t = 35
l i g h t w id th = 35
panel width = btn width ∗ num ce l l s + ( num ce l l s +1)∗
c e l l p add ing x
pane l he i ght = btn he i ght + 2∗ c e l l p add ing y + t i t l e h e i g h t +
l i g h t h e i g h t
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gua rd d i sp l ay pane l = pygame . draw . r e c t ( screen , ( grey ) , (x , y ,
panel width , pane l he i ght ) )
#f l a g f o r c e l l bu t ton t o g g l e
for i in range (0 , num ce l l s ) :
s e l f . button pushed . append ( Fa l se )
#f l a g f o r l i g h t to t o g g l e
for i in range (0 , num ce l l s − 1) :
s e l f . l i g h t g r e e n . append (True )
#Ti t l e
#screen . b l i t ( f on t . render ( ’Guard S ta t i on Panel ’ , True , ( b l a c k )
) , ( x+20, y+10))
#guard s t a t i o n image l oad ing
g r e en i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / greenLightAlt . png” )
r ed i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / redLightAlt . png” )
p r e s s ed i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / pressed . png” )
no tPre s s ed i con = pygame . image . load ( ” images / notpressed . png” )
panelEnabled = pygame . image . load ( ” images / pane lenab led . png” )
pane lD i sab led = pygame . image . load ( ” images / pane lD i sab led . png” )
c e l l s t a r t x = x + ce l l p add ing x
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c e l l s t a r t y = y + ce l l p add ing y+t i t l e h e i g h t+ (0 . 5 ∗
l i g h t h e i g h t )
l i g h t s t a r t x = x + ce l l p add ing x + ( btn width ∗0 . 5 ) − (
l i g h t w id th ∗ 0 . 5 )
l i g h t s t a r t y = y + ce l l p add ing y
s t a t u s s t a r t x = x + ce l l p add ing x
s t a t u s s t a r t y = y + ce l l p add ing y + t i t l e h e i g h t+ (0 . 5 ∗
l i g h t h e i g h t ) + btn he i ght + ( btn he i ght ∗ 0 . 5 )
#d i s a b l e but ton to the r i g h t o f the pane l
s e l f . d i s ab l e b tn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( c e l l s t a r t x + (
panel width ∗ 0 . 3 7 ) , y − c e l l p add ing y , 125 , b tn he i ght
) , ”Toggle Panel ” )
s e l f . d i s ab l e b tn . draw( sc r een )
#crea te enab led / d i s b a l e d i nd i c a t o r
pane l i c on s = [ panelEnabled , pane lD i sab led ]
i con d imens i ons = ( (400 , 45 ) )
s e l f . e n a b l e l a b e l = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , x + (0 . 1 8 ∗
panel width ) , y + 5 , pane l i cons , i con d imens ions , grey )
for i in range (0 , num ce l l s ) :
ce l l num = i+1
i f ce l l num == num cel l s −1:
but ton t ext = ”Trap 1”
e l i f ce l l num == num ce l l s :
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but ton t ext = ”Trap 2”
else :
bu t ton t ext = ”Ce l l %s ” % cel l num
c e l l b t n = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( c e l l s t a r t x , c e l l s t a r t y ,
btn width , b tn he i ght ) , but ton t ext )
c e l l b t n . draw( sc r een )
#Door l i g h t
i f i == num ce l l s − 2 :
l i g h t i c o n s = [ green icon , r ed i c on ]
l i g h t d imen s i on s = ( (35 , 35 ) )
l i g h t = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , l i g h t s t a r t x + (0 . 6 3 ∗
btn width ) , l i g h t s t a r t y , l i g h t i c o n s , l i g h t d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h t s . append ( l i g h t )
e l i f i == num ce l l s −1:
pass
else :
l i g h t i c o n s = [ green icon , r ed i c on ]
l i g h t d imen s i on s = ( (35 , 35 ) )
l i g h t = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , l i g h t s t a r t x , l i g h t s t a r t y
, l i g h t i c o n s , l i g h t d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h t s . append ( l i g h t )
#but ton ind i c a t o r
s t a t u s i c o n s = [ notPressed icon , p r e s s ed i c on ]
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s t a tu s d imens i ons = ( (100 , 20) )
s t a tu s = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , s t a t u s s t a r t x ,
s t a t u s s t a r t y , s t a tu s i c on s , s ta tus d imens ions , grey )
#adding a l l o b j e c t s to r e s p e c t i v e l i s t s
s e l f . c e l l b t n s . append ( c e l l b t n )
s e l f . b t n s t a tu s e s . append ( s t a tu s )
#ad ju s t i n g p lacements f o r next i t e r a t i o n o f icon and but ton
crea t i on
l i g h t s t a r t x += btn width + ce l l p add ing x
c e l l s t a r t x += btn width + ce l l p add ing x
s t a t u s s t a r t x += btn width + ce l l p add ing x
def d i sab l ePane l ( s e l f ) :
i f s e l f . pane l enab led == True :
s e l f . pane l enab led = Fal se
s e l f . e n a b l e l a b e l . change s ta t e ( )
def enablePanel ( s e l f ) :
i f s e l f . pane l enab led == False :
s e l f . pane l enab led = True
s e l f . e n a b l e l a b e l . change s ta t e ( )
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2.3 Prison Indicator Image Display Code
This portion of the code was created to enable images to be easily interchangeable
such as a closed door changing to an open door image or a red light changing to green.
import pygame
from pygame . locals import ∗
class I nd i c a t o r :
def i n i t ( s e l f , sim=None , x=0, y=0, i cons = [ ] , i c o n s i z e=
None , background co lo r=None ) :
i f sim :
s e l f . state num = 0
s e l f . x = x
s e l f . y = y
s e l f . i cons = i cons
s e l f . sim = sim
s e l f . i c o n s i z e = i c o n s i z e
s e l f . background co lo r = background co lo r
s t a r t s t a t e i c o n = icons [ 0 ]
i f i c o n s i z e :
s t a r t s t a t e i c o n = pygame . transform . s c a l e ( s t a r t s t a t e i c o n ,
i c o n s i z e )
sim . s c r een . b l i t ( s t a r t s t a t e i c o n , (x , y ) )
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def change s ta t e ( s e l f , s c r e en=None , state num=None ) :
i f state num i s None :
s e l f . state num = ( s e l f . state num + 1) % 2
s t a t e i c o n = s e l f . i cons [ s e l f . state num ]
i f s e l f . i c o n s i z e :
s t a t e i c o n = pygame . transform . s c a l e ( s t a t e i c on , s e l f .
i c o n s i z e )
i f s c r een i s None :
s c r een = s e l f . sim . s c r een
i f s e l f . background co lo r :
shape = pygame . Sur face ( s e l f . i c o n s i z e , f l a g s=SRCALPHA)
shape . f i l l ( s e l f . background co lo r )
s c r een . b l i t ( shape , ( s e l f . x , s e l f . y ) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
s c r een . b l i t ( s t a t e i c on , ( s e l f . x , s e l f . y ) )
2.4 Prison Mantrap Image Display Code
This portion of the code was created to show the state of the mantrap doors within
the environment.
from pygame . locals import ∗
import pygbutton
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import i n d i c a t o r
class ManTrap :
def i n i t ( s e l f , sim=None , x=0, y=0, c u r r e n t s t a t e =0) :
i f sim i s not None :
c e l l p add ing x = 25
ce l l p add ing y = 25
t i t l e h e i g h t = 25
i nd i c a t o r s pane l w id th = 100
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
s c r een = sim . sc r een
f ont = sim . f ont
#s e l f . inLoop = Fal se #i f a thread i s running on a door
s e l f . door1Closed = True
s e l f . l ock1Closed = True
s e l f . door2Closed = True
s e l f . l ock2Closed = True
s e l f . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = True #True i s green s t a t e
panel width = (3∗ c e l l p add ing x +200) ∗ 2
pane l he i ght = 2∗ c e l l p add ing y+325+ t i t l e h e i g h t
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c e l l d o o r s t a r t x = x+ ce l l p add ing x+ind i c a t o r s pane l w id th
+ 15
c e l l d o o r s t a r t y = y+(3 ∗ c e l l p add ing y )+t i t l e h e i g h t
c e l l c o n t r o l p a n e l = pygame . draw . r e c t ( screen , ( grey ) , (x , y ,
panel width , pane l he i ght ) )
#Ti t l e and door l a b e l s
s c r een . b l i t ( f on t . render ( ’Man Trap ’ , True , ( black ) ) , ( x+10, y
+10))
s c r een . b l i t ( f on t . render ( ’ 1 ’ , True , ( b lack ) ) , (
c e l l d o o r s t a r t x + 60 , c e l l d o o r s t a r t y − 40) )
s c r een . b l i t ( f on t . render ( ’ 2 ’ , True , ( b lack ) ) , (
c e l l d o o r s t a r t x + 215 , c e l l d o o r s t a r t y − 40) )
#Trap Door 1
t r ap doo r d imens i ons = ( (130 , 260 ) )
c l o s e d do o r i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / closedTrap . png”
)
open door i con= pygame . image . load ( ” images /openTrap . png” )
c e l l d o o r i c o n s = [ c l o s ed doo r i c on , open door i con ]
s e l f . t rap door1 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , c e l l d o o r s t a r t x ,
c e l l d o o r s t a r t y , c e l l d o o r i c o n s , t r ap doo r d imens i ons )
#Trap Door 2
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t r ap doo r d imens i ons = ( (130 , 260 ) )
c l o s e d do o r i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / closedTrap . png”
)
open door i con= pygame . image . load ( ” images /openTrap . png” )
c e l l d o o r i c o n s = [ c l o s ed doo r i c on , open door i con ]
s e l f . t rap door2 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , c e l l d o o r s t a r t x
+ 150 , c e l l d o o r s t a r t y , c e l l d o o r i c o n s ,
t r ap doo r d imens i ons )
#Contro l Panel icon l oad ing
g r e en i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / greenLightAlt . png” )
r ed i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / redLightAlt . png” )
l o c k i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / locked . png” )
un lo ck i con = pygame . image . load ( ” images /unlocked . png” )
#Door l i g h t
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x = c e l l d o o r s t a r t x + 105
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t y = c e l l d o o r s t a r t y − 80
i n d i c a t o r i c o n s = [ green icon , r ed i c on ]
i nd i c a t o r d imen s i on s = ( (65 , 70) )
s e l f . s e c u r e i n d i c a t o r = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim ,
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x , i n d i c a t o r s t a r t y , i n d i c a t o r i c o n s ,
i nd i c a t o r d imen s i on s )
#loc k unlock icon 1
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l o c k s t a r t x = c e l l d o o r s t a r t x − 100
l o c k s t a r t y = c e l l d o o r s t a r t y + 70
l o c k i c o n s = [ l o ck i con , un lo ck i con ]
l o ck d imens i ons = ( (65 , 70 ) )
s e l f . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 1 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , l o c k s t a r t x ,
l o c k s t a r t y , l o ck i c on s , l ock d imens ions , grey )
#loc k unlock icon 2
l o c k s t a r t x = c e l l d o o r s t a r t x + 310
l o c k s t a r t y = c e l l d o o r s t a r t y + 70
l o c k i c o n s = [ l o ck i con , un lo ck i con ]
l o ck d imens i ons = ( (65 , 70 ) )
s e l f . l o c k i nd i c a t o r 2 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , l o c k s t a r t x ,
l o c k s t a r t y , l o ck i c on s , l ock d imens ions , grey )
#door key 1
#k e y s t a r t x = c e l l d o o r s t a r t x − 110
#k e y s t a r t y = l o c k s t a r t y +85
#key b tn w i d t h = 90
#k e y b t n h e i g h t = 40
#k e y b t n t e x t = ”Unlock Key”
#s e l f . k ey b tn1 = pygbut ton . PygButton (( k e y s t a r t x ,
k e y s t a r t y , k ey b tn w id th , k e y b t n h e i g h t ) , k e y b t n t e x t )
#s e l f . k ey b tn1 . draw( screen )
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#door key 2
#k e y s t a r t x = c e l l d o o r s t a r t x + 300
#k e y s t a r t y = l o c k s t a r t y +85
#key b tn w i d t h = 90
#k e y b t n h e i g h t = 40
#k e y b t n t e x t = ”Unlock Key”
#s e l f . k ey b tn2 = pygbut ton . PygButton (( k e y s t a r t x ,
k e y s t a r t y , k ey b tn w id th , k e y b t n h e i g h t ) , k e y b t n t e x t )
#s e l f . k ey b tn2 . draw( screen )
2.5 Prison Cell Door Image Display Code
This portion of the code was created to show the state of the prison cell doors
within the environment.
from pygame . locals import ∗
import pygbutton
import i n d i c a t o r
class Pr i sonCe l l :
def i n i t ( s e l f , sim=None , ce l l num=0, x=0, y=0,
c u r r e n t s t a t e =0) :
i f sim i s not None :
c e l l p add ing x = 25
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c e l l p add ing y = 25
t i t l e h e i g h t = 25
i nd i c a t o r s pane l w id th = 100
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
s c r een = sim . sc r een
f ont = sim . f ont
s e l f . inLoop = False #i f a thread i s running on a door
s e l f . doorClosed = True
s e l f . l ockClosed = True
s e l f . i nd i c a t o rL i gh t = True #True i s green s t a t e
panel width = 3∗ c e l l p add ing x+100+150
pane l he i ght = 2∗ c e l l p add ing y+250+ t i t l e h e i g h t
c e l l d o o r s t a r t x = x+2∗ c e l l p add ing x+ind i c a t o r s pane l w id th
c e l l d o o r s t a r t y = y+ce l l p add ing y+t i t l e h e i g h t
c e l l c o n t r o l p a n e l = pygame . draw . r e c t ( screen , ( grey ) , (x , y ,
panel width , pane l he i ght ) )
#Ti t l e
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s c r een . b l i t ( f on t . render ( ’ Ce l l %s ’ % cel l num , True , ( black ) ) ,
( x+10, y+10) )
#Ce l l Door
c e l l d o o r d imen s i on s = ( (150 , 250 ) )
c l o s e d do o r i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / closedDoor . png”
)
open door i con= pygame . image . load ( ” images /openDoor . png” )
c e l l d o o r i c o n s = [ c l o s ed doo r i c on , open door i con ]
s e l f . c e l l d o o r = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , c e l l d o o r s t a r t x ,
c e l l d o o r s t a r t y , c e l l d o o r i c o n s , c e l l d o o r d imen s i on s )
#Contro l Panel
g r e en i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / greenLightAlt . png” )
r ed i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” images / redLightAlt . png” )
l o c k i c o n = pygame . image . load ( ” images / locked . png” )
un lo ck i con = pygame . image . load ( ” images /unlocked . png” )
#Door l i g h t
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x = x+ce l l p add ing x + 10
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t y = c e l l d o o r s t a r t y
i n d i c a t o r i c o n s = [ green icon , r ed i c on ]
i nd i c a t o r d imen s i on s = ( (70 , 75 ) )
s e l f . c e l l d o o r i n d i c a t o r = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim ,
i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x , i n d i c a t o r s t a r t y , i n d i c a t o r i c o n s ,
i nd i c a t o r d imen s i on s )
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#loc k unlock icon
l o c k s t a r t x = i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x
l o c k s t a r t y = c e l l d o o r s t a r t y + 85
l o c k i c o n s = [ l o ck i con , un lo ck i con ]
l o ck d imens i ons = ( (75 , 75 ) )
s e l f . l o c k i n d i c a t o r = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( sim , l o c k s t a r t x ,
l o c k s t a r t y , l o ck i c on s , l ock d imens ions , grey )
#door key
k ey s t a r t x = i n d i c a t o r s t a r t x − 20
k ey s t a r t y = l o c k s t a r t y+85
key btn width = 120
key btn he i ght = 40
key btn t ext = ”Manual Open”
s e l f . key btn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( key s ta r t x , key s ta r t y ,
key btn width , key btn he i ght ) , key btn t ext )
s e l f . key btn . draw( sc r een )
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Appendix C. Power Substation Environment Y-Box
Communication and Interface Code
This code was used to run the Y-Box interface of the Power Substation environ-
ment. The code enables the reading of power output to the outlets as well as the
voltage as it travels through the meter. The Y-Box communication engine shown in
Appendix A is also used in this software. The ”Indicator” code shown in Appendix
B is also leveraged in this code.
3.1 Power Substation Interface and Y-Box Communication Code
This code simulates and displays power output from power substation outlets.
import pygame
from pygame . locals import ∗
import time
import thread
import Ybox
import math
import i n d i c a t o r
import pygbutton
#
################################################################
# Author : Evan Plumley
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#
# This program i s the comminication engine f o r the Y−box and
the GUI
# fo r monitor ing the power sub s t a t i on
#
#
#
################################################################
class PsSim :
def i n i t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . running = True
s e l f . s c r e en = None
s e l f . s i z e = s e l f . width , s e l f . he ight = 1350 , 970
s e l f . ybox = Ybox . Ybox ( )
s e l f . pr isonPower = True
s e l f . waterPower = True
s e l f . homePower = True
s e l f . meterAlarm1Trip = Fal se
s e l f . meterAlarm2Trip = Fal se
s e l f . l ine1amps = 31.1000
s e l f . l ine2amps = 31.1000
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 1 = Fal se
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 2 = Fal se
s e l f . c l i ckmid1 = Fal se
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s e l f . c l i ckmid2 = Fal se
s e l f . c l i c k l ow1 = False
s e l f . c l i c k l ow2 = False
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 1 = Fal se
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 2 = Fal se
startAmp = 400
#send o r i g i n a l mA to the meters
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , startAmp) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 1500 )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , startAmp) # 2
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 1500 )
#l i n e t r i p s a t 40 r e s e t s a t 35
#nue t r a l t r i p s a t 90 and r e s e t s a t 85
#I n i t i a l i z e screen
print ( ” here ” )
pygame . i n i t ( )
s e l f . f on t = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 25)
s e l f . f ont2 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 45)
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s e l f . f ont3 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 35)
s e l f . f ont4 = pygame . f on t . SysFont ( ’ Times ’ , 15)
pygame . d i sp l a y . s e t c a p t i o n ( ’Power Substat ion Monitor ’ )
s e l f . s c r e en = pygame . d i sp l a y . set mode ( s e l f . s i z e , pygame .
HWSURFACE | pygame .DOUBLEBUF)
s e l f . s c r e en . f i l l ( ( white ) )
s e l f . s c r e en . s e t c o l o r k e y ( white )
#add the pygbut tons
btn he i ght = 35
btn1x = 275
btn2x = 450
btn3x = 625
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’ Line 1 t r i p s at 40 r e s e t s
at 35 . ’ , True , ( b lack ) ) , (270 , 900) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’ Nuetra l ( Line 2) t r i p s at
90 and r e s e t s at 85 ’ , True , ( b lack ) ) , (270 , 920) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’ Line 1 Amp Contro l ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (270 , 650) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont4 . render ( ’ Line 2 Amp Contro l ’ ,
True , ( b lack ) ) , (450 , 650) )
s e l f . l i n e 1h i gh b tn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn1x , 700 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”High : 50” )
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s e l f . l i n e 2h i gh b tn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn2x , 700 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”High : 50” )
s e l f . l ine1mid btn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn1x , 750 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Mid : 31 .1 ” )
s e l f . l ine2mid btn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn2x , 750 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Mid : 31 .1 ” )
s e l f . l i n e1 l ow btn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn1x , 800 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Low : 8 . 1 ” )
s e l f . l i n e2 l ow btn = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn2x , 800 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Low : 8 . 1 ” )
s e l f . l i n e 1 z e r o b t n = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn1x , 850 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Zero” )
s e l f . l i n e 2 z e r o b t n = pygbutton . PygButton ( ( btn2x , 850 , 125 ,
b tn he i ght ) , ”Zero” )
s e l f . l i n e 1h i gh b tn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l i n e 2h i gh b tn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
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s e l f . l ine1mid btn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l ine2mid btn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l i n e1 l ow btn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l i n e2 l ow btn . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l i n e 1 z e r o b t n . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
s e l f . l i n e 2 z e r o b t n . draw( s e l f . s c r e en )
#add PLC output t i t l e
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , black , (450 , −5, 500 , 55) , 2)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ’Power Meter and Relay
Output ’ , True , ( b lack ) ) , (480 , 5) )
#add the meter
s e l f . meterpos = (300 ,150)
s e l f . meter = pygame . image . load ( ” psimages/meter . png” )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . meter , s e l f . meterpos )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
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#add the r e l a y
s e l f . r e l aypo s = (800 , 100)
s e l f . r e l a y = pygame . image . load ( ” psimages/ r e l a y . jpg ” )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . r e lay , s e l f . r e l aypo s )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , l i g h t g r e en , (916 , 237 , 280 ,
65) , 0)
#s e l f . r i c e = pygame . image . load (” psimages/ r i c e . j p g ”)
#s e l f . s creen . b l i t ( s e l f . r i ce , (1030 ,239) )
#add ra iden and e l e c t r i c i t y
s e l f . ra idenpos = (35 , 320)
s e l f . r a idenbo l tpo s = (151 , 330)
#s e l f . ra iden = pygame . image . load (” psimages/ pikachu . png”)
s e l f . ra iden = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages / ra iden . png” )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . ra iden , s e l f . ra idenpos )
s e l f . r a i d enbo l t = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages / raidenpower . png
” )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . r a idenbo l t , s e l f . r a idenbo l tpo s )
s e l f . power1 = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages /power . png” )
s e l f . power2 = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages /power . png” )
s e l f . power3 = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages /power . png” )
s e l f . power1pos = (720 , 300)
s e l f . power2pos = (720 , 340)
s e l f . power3pos = (720 , 380)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . power1 , s e l f . power1pos )
133
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . power2 , s e l f . power2pos )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . power3 , s e l f . power3pos )
#add ind i c a t o r l i g h t s f o r power a t i d i v i d u a l s t a t i o n s
g r e en i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” psimages/ greenLightAlt . png” )
r ed i c on = pygame . image . load ( ” psimages/ redLightAlt . png” )
l i g h t i c o n s = [ green icon , r ed i c on ]
l i g h t d imen s i on s = ( (100 , 100 ) )
s e l f . l i g h t 1 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 850 , 800 , l i g h t i c o n s
, l i g h t d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h t 2 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 1020 , 800 ,
l i g h t i c o n s , l i g h t d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h t 3 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 1190 , 800 ,
l i g h t i c o n s , l i g h t d imen s i on s )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Pr ison ” , True , ( b lack ) ) ,
(860 , 900) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Water” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(1030 , 900) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Home” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(1200 , 900) )
l i g h t n i n g = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages / l i g h t n i n g . png” )
cover = pygame . image . load ( ”psimages/whiteCover . png” )
l i g h t n i n g i c o n s = [ l i gh tn ing , cover ]
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l i g h tn i ng d imen s i on s = ( (40 , 100 ) )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng1 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 875 , 700 ,
l i g h t n i n g i c o n s , l i g h tn i ng d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng2 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 1045 , 700 ,
l i g h t n i n g i c o n s , l i g h tn i ng d imen s i on s )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng3 = i nd i c a t o r . I nd i c a t o r ( s e l f , 1210 , 700 ,
l i g h t n i n g i c o n s , l i g h tn i ng d imen s i on s )
#################################
# add the amps to the meter
#################################
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
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pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
try :
thread . s t a r t new thread ( timedReads , ( s e l f , ) )
except Exception as e :
print ( e )
s e l f . running = True
#Handle a l l e v en t s
def on event ( s e l f , event ) :
i f event . type == pygame .QUIT:
s e l f . running = Fal se
else : #Determine i f but ton was c l i c k e d
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e 1h i gh b tn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 1 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e 2h i gh b tn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 2 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l ine1mid btn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i ckmid1 = True
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i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l ine2mid btn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i ckmid2 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e1 l ow btn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c k l ow1 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e2 l ow btn . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c k l ow2 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e 1 z e r o b t n . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 1 = True
i f ’ c l i c k ’ in s e l f . l i n e 2 z e r o b t n . handleEvent ( event ) :
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 2 = True
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
def on loop ( s e l f ) :
pass
def on render ( s e l f ) :
pass
def on cleanup ( s e l f ) :
pygame . qu i t ( )
#s t a r t program
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def on execute ( s e l f ) :
#i f s e l f . o n i n i t ( ) == False :
#s e l f . running = Fa l se
while ( s e l f . running ) :
for event in pygame . event . get ( ) :
s e l f . on event ( event )
s e l f . on loop ( )
s e l f . on render ( )
s e l f . on cleanup ( )
def timedReads ( s e l f ) :
past = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g s t a r t i n g
mi l i second time to execu te reads from the ybox
meter current = 13.0001
while True :
p r e sen t = int (round( time . time ( ) ∗ 1000) ) #g e t t i n g pre s en t
time to comapre to pas t
#check to see i f 100 m i l l i s e c o n d s have passed
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i f pre sent − past >= 40 :
past = pre sent
####################################
# read the SEL power s t a t e and d i s p l a y
###################################
pr i sonSta t e = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 4 )
waterState = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 5 )
homeState = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 6 )
#Prison change d i s p l a y
i f s e l f . pr isonPower == True and pr i sonSta t e == (”r1 , 4 , 1 ” ) :
s e l f . pr isonPower = Fal se
s e l f . l i g h t 1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 0 , 1 )
i f s e l f . pr isonPower == False and pr i sonSta t e == (”r1 , 4 , 0 ” ) :
s e l f . pr isonPower = True
s e l f . l i g h t 1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng1 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 0 , 0 )
#Water change d i s p l a y
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i f s e l f . waterPower == True and waterState == (”r1 , 5 , 1 ” ) :
s e l f . waterPower = Fal se
s e l f . l i g h t 2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 1 , 1 )
i f s e l f . waterPower == False and waterState == (”r1 , 5 , 0 ” ) :
s e l f . waterPower = True
s e l f . l i g h t 2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng2 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 1 , 0 )
#Home change d i s p l a y
i f s e l f . homePower == True and homeState == (”r1 , 6 , 1 ” ) :
print ( homeState )
s e l f . homePower = Fal se
s e l f . l i g h t 3 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng3 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 2 , 1 )
i f s e l f . homePower == False and homeState == (”r1 , 6 , 0 ” ) :
s e l f . homePower = True
s e l f . l i g h t 3 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . l i g h tn i ng3 . change s ta t e ( )
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 2 , 0 )
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######################################################
# Read s t a t e o f the meter alarm to foward to the r e l a y
######################################################
meterAlarm1 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 1 )
meterAlarm2 = s e l f . ybox . sendRead (1 , 2 )
i f meterAlarm1 == (”r1 , 1 , 1 ” ) :# and s e l f . meterAlarm1Trip ==
False :
s e l f . meterAlarm1Trip == True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 4 , 1 )
i f meterAlarm1 == (”r1 , 1 , 0 ” ) :# and s e l f . meterAlarm1Trip ==
True :
s e l f . meterAlarm1Trip == False
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 4 , 0 )
i f meterAlarm2 == (”r1 , 2 , 1 ” ) :# and s e l f . meterAlarm2Trip ==
False :
s e l f . meterAlarm2Trip == True
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 5 , 1 )
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i f meterAlarm2 == (”r1 , 2 , 0 ” ) : #and s e l f . meterAlarm2Trip ==
True :
s e l f . meterAlarm2Trip == False
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (2 , 5 , 0 )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 1 == True :
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 1 = Fal se
s e l f . l ine1amps = 50 .00
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , 700 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 4000 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
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s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 2 == True :
s e l f . c l i c kh i g h 2 = Fal se
s e l f . l ine2amps = 50 .00
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 700 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 4000 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
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i f s e l f . c l i ckmid1 == True :
s e l f . c l i ckmid1 = Fal se
s e l f . l ine1amps = 31 .10
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , 400 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 3000 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i ckmid2 == True :
s e l f . c l i ckmid2 = Fal se
s e l f . l ine2amps = 31 .10
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 400 ) # wri t e meter 1
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s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 3000 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c k l ow1 == True :
s e l f . c l i c k l ow1 = False
s e l f . l ine1amps = 8.10
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , 100 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 1500 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
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s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c k l ow2 == True :
s e l f . c l i c k l ow2 = False
s e l f . l ine2amps = 8.10
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 100 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 1500 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
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s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 1 == True :
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 1 = Fal se
s e l f . l ine1amps = 0
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 2 , 0 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 3 , 0 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 2 == True :
s e l f . c l i c k z e r o 2 = Fal se
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s e l f . l ine2amps = 0
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 1 , 0 ) # wri t e meter 1
s e l f . ybox . sendWrite (0 , 4 , 0 )
pygame . draw . r e c t ( s e l f . screen , white , (380 , 226 , 265 , 255) , 0)
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”Amps” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(460 , 235) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 1 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ” 2 : ” , True , ( black ) ) ,
(400 , 340) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine1amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 300) )
s e l f . s c r e en . b l i t ( s e l f . f ont3 . render ( ”%.4 f ” % s e l f . l ine2amps ,
True , ( black ) ) , (460 , 340) )
pygame . d i sp l a y . update ( )
i f name == ” ma in ” :
red = (225 , 0 , 0 )
white = (255 , 255 , 255)
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black = (0 ,0 , 0 )
grey = (200 , 200 , 200)
dark grey = (140 , 140 , 140)
blue = (130 , 130 , 255)
dark b lue = (0 , 0 , 150)
green = (0 ,240 , 0 )
dark green = (0 ,175 , 0 )
l i g h t g r e e n = (30 ,210 ,30)
psSim = PsSim ( )
psSim . on execute ( )
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